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Abstract
This Article addresses the regulation of the relationships between
unmarried cohabitants. It challenges the conventional divide between
conservative and liberal approaches. On one hand, moral condemnation of
nonmarital conjugal relationships and public policy in favor of marriage lead
conservatives to reject the application of marriage law to cohabitating
partners. On the other hand, based on principles such as freedom, tolerance,
and equality, liberals tend to equate the mutual legal commitments of
cohabitants with those ofmarriedpartners. I break with conventional analysis
by offering a novel liberal model that separates between the mutual obligations
of cohabitants and married partners. The proposed model is based on a
pluralist constitutional theory that underscores the responsibility of the liberal
state to create a range of social institutions that offer meaningful choices to
individuals. The Article thus argues that the law should develop two distinctive
legal regimes for marriage and cohabitation and provide couples with
substantive freedom to choose between them. It offers arguments based in
morality and efficiency to support the proposed bipolar default systems and the
role of marriage as a screening mechanism. The Article further shows that this
pluralist theory goes well beyond standard cohabitation law and provides a
frameworkfor an innovative pluralist regulation of spousal relationships. It
demonstrates the potential contribution of such a framework regarding three
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publicly disputed topics: same-sex marriage and civil unions; covenant
marriage; and secular regulation of religious marriage.
Table of Contents
I. Introduction ................................................................................ 1567
II. Existing Approaches and Their Limitations ............................... 1574
A. The Status Model Distinction Between Marriage
and C ohabitation .................................................................. 1574
B. The Contractual Distinction Between Marriage
and C ohabitation .................................................................. 1575
C. The Contractual Equation Between Marriage
and C ohabitation .................................................................. 1577
1. The Implicit Contract Model ......................................... 1577
2. The Revised Relational Contract Model ....................... 1578
D. The Status Model Equation Between Marriage
and C ohabitation .................................................................. 1580
1. The Extra-Contractual Argument .................................. 1580
2. The Power Gap Argument ............................................ 1581
3. The Same-Sex Couples Argument ................................ 1582
4. The Status Model in Existing Jurisdictions ................... 1582
E. The Need for a New Theory ................................................ 1585
1. Limitations of the Contractual Approaches ................... 1586
2. Limitations of the Status Approach ............................... 1587
3. Intermediate Summary .................................................. 1589
Im. Toward a Pluralist Approach to Cohabitation Law ..................... 1589
A. The Pluralist Case for Distinguishing Marriage
and Cohabitation .................................................................. 1590
1. The Channeling Perspective: Marriage as an
Ex Ante Screening Mechanism ..................................... 1590
2. The Autonomy-Based Rationale for Pluralism .............. 1593
3. The Efficiency Perspective: Pluralism and
the Signaling Function of Marriage ............................... 1594
B. Designing Cohabitation as an Autonomy-Based
Social Institution .................................................................. 1596
1. Substantive Freedom of Choice .................................... 1597
2. Tolerance, State Responsibility, and the
Extra-Contractual Considerations ................................. 1597
3. Individualism, Right of Exit, and Relational
1566
MARRIED AGAINST THEIR WILL?
Com m itm ents ................................................................ 1599
IV. From Theory to Practice: The Pluralist Model of
C ohabitant Law .......................................................................... 1601
A . Outline of a M odel ............................................................... 1601
B. Who Should Be Defined as Cohabitants? ............... .. . . . .. . . . .. . 1604
C. Property Relationship Between Cohabitants ........................ 1607
1. The Equal Division Rule and Its Underlying
R ationales ...................................................................... 1607
2. The Applicability of the Equal Division Rule's
Rationales to Cohabitation ............................................ 1609
3. Cohabitation Property Law ........................................... 1610
a. Deviations from the Equal Division Rule
in Case of Asymmetric Contribution ....................... 1610
b. Inheritance, Gifts, and Property Acquired
Before Cohabitation ................................................. 1611
c. Increased Human Capital ......................................... 1612
D. Spousal Support and Compensation for Loss-
of-C areer .............................................................................. 1616
1. Models of Spousal Support and Compensation for
C areer L oss ................................................................... 16 16
2. Imposing Spousal Support and Compensation for
Career Loss on Cohabitants ........................................... 1618
E. Relational Commitments Between Long-Term
C ohabitants .......................................................................... 162 1
F. Opting Out of Cohabitation Commitments .......................... 1622
V. Toward Pluralist Theory of Spousal Regulation ......................... 1626
A. Same-Sex Marriage and Civil Unions ................................. 1626
B . Religious M arriage .............................................................. 1627
C. Covenant M arriage .............................................................. 1632
VI. Conclusion and Further Challenges ............................................ 1634
I. Introduction
This Article addresses the regulation of economic relationships between
unmarried cohabitants, criticizing the extant approaches to cohabitation and
offering a new legal model. The proposed model is based on a pluralist
constitutional theory that underscores the responsibility of the liberal state to
create a range of social institutions that offer meaningful choices to individuals.
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This Article, thus, argues that the law should offer two distinctive legal regimes
for marriage and cohabitation and that it should provide the couples with
substantive freedom to choose between them. This Article further shows that
this pluralist theory goes well beyond standard cohabitation law and can
provide a framework for an innovative pluralist regulation of spousal
relationships.
Traditionally, American law sharply distinguished between marriage and
cohabitation, and even invalidated contracts in which the cohabitants explicitly
took upon themselves marriage-like commitments.' Since the last decades of
the twentieth century, however, there is a trend to narrow the gap between the
mutual obligations of cohabitants and those of married partners.2 Conventional
wisdom depicts this trend as liberal,3 while opposition to it is viewed as
conservative 4 and moralistic.5 The new restatement on family dissolution6 may
1. See, e.g., Harry G. Prince, Public Policy Limitations on Cohabitation Agreements:
Unruly Horse or Circus Pony?, 70 MINN. L. REv. 163, 165 (1985) (discussing the traditional
policy that invalidates contracts between cohabitants).
2. See Marvin v. Marvin, 557 P.2d 106, 122 (Cal. 1976) (validating a contract between
cohabitants and also applying marriage commitment between cohabitants according to the
implicit contract theory). But cf Morone v. Morone, 413 N.E.2d 1154, 1158 (N.Y. 1980)
(limiting the recognition of mutual commitments between cohabitants to explicit contracts);
Lindsey v. Lindsey, 678 P.2d 328, 331 (Wash. 1984) (applying marriage law to cohabitants
regardless of their implicit contract).
3. See, e.g., Elizabeth S. Scott, Marriage, Cohabitation and Collective Responsibilityfor
Dependency, 2004 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 225, 227 ("Other critics contend that, in an era in which
family arrangements are understood to be a matter of private choice, cohabitation unions and
marriage should be subject to the same legal treatment." (emphasis added)); see also Herma H.
Kay & Carol Amyx, Marvin v. Marvin: Preserving the Option, 65 CAL. L. REv. 937, 937
(1977) (supporting the process of granting rights to cohabitants on the basis of liberal rationales
of increasing freedom). For similar approaches in the context of other Western jurisdictions, see
H.A. Finlay, Defining the Informal Marriage, 3 U.N.S.W. L.J. 279,279 (1980) (finding support
for the application of marriage law to cohabitants under a liberal-contractual theory).
4. See, e.g., Scott, supra note 3, at 227 ("On the other side of the debate are highly
visible defenders of marriage, many of whom are social and political conservatives with a
religious or moral agenda."); Lynn D. Wardle, Deconstructing Family: A Critique of the
American Law Institute's "Domestic Partners" Proposal, 2001 BYU L. REV. 1189, 1193-94
(arguing that imposing marriage commitments on cohabitants undermines marriage); see also
Hewitt v. Hewitt, 394 N.E.2d 1204, 1210 (Ill. 1979) ("[Plublic policy disfavors private
contractual alternatives to marriage.").
5. See, e.g., J. Thomas Oldham & David S. Caudill, A Reconnaissance of Public Policy
Restrictions upon Enforcement of Contracts Between Cohabitants, 18 FAM. L.Q. 93, 106 (1984)
("Because of the perceived immorality of these relationships, even express contracts between
cohabitants were not enforced.").
6. See AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION:
ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 907 (LexisNexis 2002) [hereinafter ALI].
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reflect the next seemingly liberal step,7 which is to equalize completely the
regulation of the economic relationships between unmarried cohabitants and
between married partners.
8
This Article breaks with conventional wisdom by presenting a liberal-
pluralist case against equalizing the mutual obligations of cohabitants and married
partners. It offers three rationales for distinguishing marriage and cohabitation.
It first offers a pluralist observation: A variety of spousal relationships
characterized by different levels of commitments exist in our society.9 The
distinction between marriage and cohabitation is justified because it provides a
screening mechanism for the spouses to express their different preferences.' 0
The second rationale argues that the law should design marriage and
cohabitation as separate spousal institutions as part of society's responsibility to
provide a diversity of spousal institutions."l It demonstrates the importance of
diversity on the basis of a pluralist attitude that is committed to autonomy as a
primary liberal value and emphasizes the responsibility of the liberal state not
only to respect individuals' choices, but also to create a variety of social
institutions that offer meaningful choices to individuals.
12
The third rationale is based on an innovative efficiency analysis, which
supports the intrinsic values of autonomy and pluralism. 3 While equating
marriage and cohabitation provides a single default rule, the distinction between
marriage and cohabitation provides a menu.' 4 A bipolar default system, I argue,
is vital for an efficient "signaling" process and encouraging information delivery
between spouses.
7. See Nancy D. Polikoff, Making Marriage Matter Less: The ALI Domestic Partner
Principles Are One Step in the Right Direction, 2004 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 353, 354 (praising AL
Principles for acknowledging diversity and legitimate unconventional family forms).
8. See ALI, supra note 6, at 907 (discussing domestic partners and the legal obligations
domestic partners have toward one another at the dissolution of their relationship).
9. See infra Part III (highlighting the different approaches to cohabitation law).
10. See infra Part III.A. 1 (arguing that couples should have the ability to choose the legal
institution that best fits their relationship).
11. See infra Part III.A.2 (arguing that the law should design a variety of spousal options
in order to support the diversity of spousal lifestyles).
12. See JOSEPH RAZ, ETHIcs IN THE PUBLIC DOMAIN: ESSAYS IN THE MORALrY OF LAW
AND POLMCS 179 (1994) (supporting the active role of the state that stems from his liberal
account of autonomy); see also infra notes 132-33 and accompanying text (noting Raz's work
further).
13. See infra Part III.A.3 (discussing how the pluralist approach provides signaling
effect).
14. See Ian Ayres, Menus Matter, 73 U. CHI. L. REv. 3, 3 (2006) ("A menu is a contractual
offer that empowers the offeree to accept more than one type of contract."). This Article,
however, refers to menus that are offers from the state to both partners.
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Legal scholars have partially recognized the liberal distinction between
marriage and cohabitation obligations.' 5 Focusing solely on the presumed wishes
of typical cohabitants, these scholars hold that the absence of a formal marriage
reflects the rejection of marriage laws.' 6 This contractual argument underlies the
explicit contract model that was adopted in few jurisdictions and recognizes
economic obligations between cohabitants only when the parties have entered a
formal agreement. 7
This contractual model, however, is incomplete, as it fails to address three
contrasting arguments in favor of imposing marriage law on cohabitants:
exploitation due to gender differences,' 8 relational commitments embedded in
long-term cohabitation,' 9 and the case of same sex couples that are disqualified
from marriage.20
Prominent scholars and lawmakers believe these contrasting arguments
support the complete equalization of marriage and cohabitation commitments
based on either a relational contrace or the status model.22
15. See Ruth Deech, The Case Against Legal Recognition of Cohabitation, 29 INT'L &
COMP. L.Q. 480, 480-81 (1980) (opposing the modem trend to apply marriage law to
cohabitants from the liberal-individualistic perspective); David Westfall, Forcing Incidents of
Marriage on Unmarried Cohabitants: The American Law Institute's Principles of Family
Dissolution, 76 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 1467, 1471 (2001) (criticizing ALl for equating marriage
and cohabitation); Marsha Garrison, Is Consent Necessary? An Evaluation of the Emerging
Law of Cohabitant Obligation, 52 UCLA L. REv. 815, 815 (2005) (arguing that marriage and
cohabitation are not functionally equivalent).
16. See Westfall, supra note 15, at 1470 ("Imposing marital obligations on parties in an
informal relationship is wholly at odds with some of the potentially liberating implications of
the Marvin court's decision.").
17. See infra Part II.B (discussing the contractual distinction between marriage and
cohabitation).
18. See Grace G. Blumberg, Cohabitation Without Marriage: A Different Perspective, 28
UCLA L. REv. 1125, 1127-28 (1981) (suggesting imposition of marriage commitments on
cohabitants in order to protect weaker members of the family); Ira M. Ellman, "Contract
Thinking" Was Marvin's Fatal Flaw, 76 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 1365, 1365-73 (2001)
(criticizing the contractual perspective of Marvin v. Marvin and suggesting an extra-contractual
perspective to cohabitants law).
19. See Elizabeth S. Scott, Domestic Partnerships, Implied Contracts, andLaw Reform,
in RECONCEIVING THE FAMILY 331, 337-49 (Robin F. Wilson ed., 2006) (criticizing the status
model basis of the ALl and suggesting replacing it with the relational contract model); Elizabeth
S. Scott & Robert E. Scott, Marriage as Relational Contract, 84 VA. L. REv. 1225, 1229-33
(1998) (applying relational contract theory to the long-term commitment embedded in
marriage).
20. See infra Part II.D.3 (describing the same-sex counterargument).
21. See Scott, supra note 3, at 258-61 (suggesting the law should presume an implied
contract to apply marriage law in any case of cohabitation spanning over five years).
22. The status model applies marriage-like commitments to cohabitants that are living
together as a couple, without need-to argue for explicit or implied contract. See ALl, supra note
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This Article demonstrates, however, that all the existing approaches (the
traditional and contractual distinctions on the one hand and the relational and
status equalizations on the other hand) share the same partial and insufficient
view of cohabitation law. Hence, instead of choosing between complete
equation or total separation of marriage and cohabitation, this Article offers a
third option: A nuanced model that selectively applies elements of marriage
law and distinguishes between different types of cohabitants. Fortunately, the
philosophical foundation of the pluralist theory prescribes three major
cornerstones for developing such a nuanced model: (1) substantive freedom of
choice;23 (2) tolerance for couples' life-styles, limited by state responsibility for
preventing exploitation; and (3) restricted individualism, emphasizing the right
of exit, yet respectful of relational commitments.
Driven by these cornerstones, this Article offers an innovative and
comprehensive legal model that integrates the arguments of the equalizing
approaches into a normative framework, without neglecting the basic
arguments in favor of the distinction between marriage and cohabitation. Three
elements comprise this model.
First, this model rests on the premise that cohabitation and marriage law
should be distinguished. Second, while the prevailing models address marriage
law as a package deal with respect to cohabitants,24 this new model applies only
selected components of marriage law to cohabitants. The third element
encompasses the criteria developed in this Article to determine which
components of marriage law are appropriate to apply to cohabitants.
As this Article explains, cohabitation law should impose on cohabitants
the responsive components of marriage law that aim to prevent exploitation and
6, at 919 ("This section thus does not require... that the parties had an implied or express
agreement .... It instead relies, as do the marriage laws, on a status classification."); see also
Grace G. Blumberg, The Regularization of Nonmarital Cohabitation: Rights and
Responsibilities in the American Welfare State, 76 NoTRE DAME L. REv. 1265, 1265-66 (2001)
(suggesting a status model regulation of cohabitant relationships).
23. This model is sensitive to cases in which life as cohabitants does not reflect the
rejection of marriage law but rather a unilateral decision of the more powerful spouse, a natural
continuation of a previous life-style, or a legal incapacity for marriage.
24. The package deal characterization of the existing models is apparent in ALI's
structuring of the chapter addressing cohabitants' obligations. ALI, supra note 6, at 907.
Paragraph 6.03 defines who are domestic partners (the ALl label for cohabitants) and
paragraphs 6.04-6.06 apply marriage commitments almost without exception on domestic
partners. Id. at 916-41. On the other side of the spectrum, the traditional stance and the
explicit contract model reject the imposition of all components of marriage law on cohabitants.
Prince, supra note 1, at 165; infra Part II.B. Unlike those all-or-nothing approaches, the
pluralist model suggests in-between approaches that apply selective and suitable components of
marriage law to cohabitants.
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protect weaker parties from marriage ex post. At the same time, the model
rejects the imposition of channeling regulation2 5 on cohabitants, which aims to
guide couples ex ante to behave according to society's vision regarding
marriage. Cohabitation law should also adopt the autonomy-based components
of marriage law-especially those that are compatible with the "right of exit"-
while leaving behind the community aspect of marriage law.26
Based on these criteria, this model distinguishes between property rules of
marriage and cohabitation. In the case of marriage, the model supports a
marital property regime that fulfills the ideal of marriage as community.2 7 This
regime insists on equal division of income accumulated during marriage,
regardless of the partners' actual contribution.28 In some circumstances it also
entails pre-marriage property, gifts and inheritance, 29 as well as increase in
human capital in the martial property.30  In contrast, the pluralist model
provides for regular cohabitants a narrow contribution-based marital property
regime. This regime categorizes only labor income that accumulates during
marriage as marital property. It also deviates from the equal division rule in
cases of asymmetry between cohabitants' contributions. Beyond marital
property law, married partners are entitled, in some circumstances, to long-term
alimony or to compensation for career loss. In contrast, according to the
25. See P.S. Atiyah, From Principles to Pragmatism: Changes in the Function of the
Judicial Process and the Law, 65 IOWA L. REV. 1249, 1251-70 (1980) (distinguishing between
the directive-channeling function of the law and its responsive-reflective aspects); Carl E.
Schneider, The Channeling Function in Family Law, 20 HOFSTRA L. REV. 495,496-505 (1992)
(describing the channeling aspects of marriage law).
26. See infra Part III.B (designing cohabitation as an autonomy-based social institution).
27. See Carolyn J. Frantz & Hanoch Dagan, Properties of Marriage, 104 COLuM. L. REV.
75, 76-81 (2004) (offering a theory of marital property law based on autonomy, community,
and equality).
28. Cf id. at 100 ("The cornerstone of the contemporary law of marital property... is the
rule of equal division upon divorce."). Even today, however, there are gaps between the marital
property laws of the different states. See id. at 106-15 (providing a survey that highlights equal
division gaps between the states); J. THoMAs OLDHAM, DIVORCE, SEPARATION AND THE
DIsTRmiBuTION OF PROPERTY § 3.03 (2007) (discussing the different distribution systems); see
also infra Part IV.C. 1 (discussing the equal division rule and its underlying rationales).
29. See Shari Motro, Labor, Luck, and Love: Reconsidering the Sanctity of Separate
Property, 102 Nw. U. L. REV. 1623, 1624 (2008) ("Unlike spouses' marital earnings, property
acquired before marriage and gifts and inheritances received during marriage are regarded as
external to the marital economic partnership. Property acquired before marriage cannot be said
to be a product of spouses' joint venture because the labor expended to produce it preceded
their union."). Motro challenges this dichotomy and points to deviations from the dichotomy
even in practice. Id. at 1636-45; see also infra Part IV.C.3 (discussing cohabitation property
law).
30. See infra Part IV.D (discussing spousal support and compensation for loss-of-career).
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pluralist model's criteria cohabitants are entitled only to short-term
rehabilitative maintenance.
Fourth, contrary to the prevailing legal discourse, the model offers a
distinction between different types of cohabitants. Thus, it develops criteria to
distinguish between trial period, regular, relational, exploitative, and same-sex
cohabitations and tailors a unique package of rights and duties to each kind of
cohabitation.
Finally, beyond the menu of default rules that the pluralist model offers, it
also supports cohabitants' freedom of contract. Yet the model's sensitivity to
power gap and exploitation enables it to adopt a nuanced approach that
distinguishes between aspects of cohabitation law and the circumstances of the
creation of contracts.
Beyond cohabitation law, the pluralist theory that I developed offers a
fresh look at other fields of spousal regulation. This Article demonstrates the
theory's potential contribution regarding three publicly disputed topics: same-
sex marriage and civil unions, covenant marriage, and secular regulation of
religious marriage.
First, this Article distinguishes between different and same-sex couples
and suggests a unique legal regime for the latter that takes into account their
legal restriction from getting married. Unlike rejected "separate but equal"
approaches, however, this Article argues that recognition of same-sex couples'
mutual commitments through cohabitation law is the third-best solution.
Hence, this Article supports the recognition of same-sex marriage or-at
least-civil union regimes.
Second, this Article supports legal regimes that enable spouses to choose
between a regular marriage and a "covenantal marriage" that is subject to
unique regulation. In the conventional political discourse, covenant marriage is
perceived as a victory of conservative approaches, and accordingly is criticized
by liberals. 31 This Article, however, sheds a pluralist light on covenant
marriage as it adds a new spousal institution to the existing menu.32
31. See infra Part V.C (describing the conventional view of covenantal marriage).
32. While the articulation of the pluralist theory and its application to cohabitant law and
civil unions are an original and innovative product of this Article, a few applications of pluralist
thought to covenant marriage and religious marriage already exist in legal scholarship. See Joel
A. Nichols, Multi-Tiered Marriage: Ideas and Influences from New York and Louisiana to the
International Community, 40 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 135, 140-42 (2007) (arguing that
covenant marriage and civil enforcement of Jewish divorce law in New York is a kind of
pluralist regulation of marriage). As demonstrated later, infra Part V.B, this Article's rationale,
scope, and application of pluralist theory are significantly different from those of Nichols, even
in the context of covenant marriage and religious marriage.
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Finally, this Article addresses contracts applying religious law to marital
relationships and discusses the proposals for turning religious marriage into an
official marriage track offered by the civil legal system.33 Apparently, these
contracts and proposals also add new spousal institutions. Yet, this Article
argues that the substantive content of the religious marriage law at hand must
satisfy the pluralist theory requirements for substantive freedom of choice,
prevention of exploitation, and right of exit.
The Article continues as follows: Part II presents the existing theoretical
approaches that support the various legal models and criticizes them. Hence, it
explains the need for a new theory. Part III develops the pluralist-liberal
theory. Part IV presents in detail the concrete legal model derived from the
new theory. Part V addresses same-sex cohabitants and goes beyond
cohabitation law to suggest a pluralist regulation model for spousal
relationships. A brief conclusion follows.
I. Existing Approaches and Their Limitations
American law and scholarship are extremely ambiguous regarding
regulation of the economic relationship between cohabitants following their
separation.34 This Part draws a roadmap of the main competing approaches
responsible for the current chaos. Somewhat ironically, this review of the
literature will show that the same theories-contractual on the one hand and
status-based on the other-have been relied upon to justify and reject the
distinction between marriage and cohabitation. I conclude this part by
exploring the shortcomings of the existing theory and identifying the need for a
new theory.
A. The Status Model Distinction Between Marriage and Cohabitation
Until the last decades of the twentieth century, moral condemnation of
nonmarital conjugal relationships and public policy considerations in favor of
marriage motivated traditional family law to fight against cohabitation in
various ways.35 Traditional law not only rejected the application of marriage
33. See Nichols, supra note 32, at 140-41 ("Rather than retaining our unitary and singular
notions of marriage and divorce law, perhaps we should take seriously the possibility of multi-
tiered marriage.").
34. See infra Part II.D.4 (providing a table summarizing the existing approaches).
35. See, e.g., Jane Lewis, Family Policy in the Post-War Period, in CROSS CURRENTS:
FA~muy LAW AND PoucY iN THE U.S. AND ENGLAND 81, 82-90 (Sanford N. Katz et al. eds.,
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law to cohabitating partners, but also invalidated explicit contracts between
cohabitants.36 While this traditional model is not very popular among states
today, there are still some modem cases that adhere to the traditional stance and
invalidate even explicit contracts between cohabitants."
B. The Contractual Distinction Between Marriage and Cohabitation
Influenced by liberal-contractual principles like freedom of choice 38 and
the state's moral neutrality, 39 family law during the second half of the twentieth
century 40 became more respectful of spouses' private choices.41 Thus, most
jurisdictions validate explicit contracts in which cohabitants take upon
themselves marriage-like commitments.42 Interestingly, however, those liberal-
2000) (noting that the legal means for discouraging cohabitation included excluding cohabitants
from marriage rights, defining children born outside of marriage as illegitimate, and, in some
states, even ciminalizing cohabitation).
36. See Oldham & Caudill, supra note 5, at 97 (explaining that contracts between
cohabitants traditionally were unenforceable); Prince, supra note 1, at 165 (noting the
traditional policy invalidating contracts between cohabitants).
37. See, e.g., Hewitt v. Hewitt, 394 N.E.2d 1204, 1207 (Ill. 1979) ("The issue of
unmarried cohabitants' mutual property ights... cannot appropriately be characterized solely
in terms of contract law. Of substantially greater importance than the rights of the immediate
parties is the impact of such recognition upon our society and the institution of marriage."); see
also Thomas v. LaRosa, 400 S.E.2d 809, 814 (W. Va. 1990) (holding that agreements for future
support, express or implied, made between adult, nonmarital partners are not enforceable).
38. See, e.g., Kozlowski v. Kozlowski, 403 A.2d 902, 909 (N.J. 1979) (Pashman, J.,
concurring) ("The decision to cohabit without marriage represents each partner's voluntary
choice as to how his or her life should be ordered a choice with which the State cannot
interfere.").
39. See Kay & Amyx, supra note 3, at 937 (supporting the Marvin arguments from the
liberal-neutral perspective).
40. See MARY A. GLENDON, THE TRANSFORMATION OF FAMILY LAW: STATE, LAW, AND
FAMILY IN THE UNITED STATES AND WESTERN EUROPE 1-6 (1989) (describing the liberalization
process in Western family law in the last decades of the twentieth century); JOHN WITrE, JR.,
FROM SACRAMENT TO CONTRACT: MARRIAGE, RELIGION, AND LAW IN THE WESTERN TRADITION
12-15 (1997) (arguing that contractual models of marriage emerged in the second half of the
twentieth century).
41. See, e.g., Jana B. Singer, The Privatization of Family Law, 1992 Wis. L. REv. 1443,
1446-48 (describing privatization processes that transformed marriage from a public institution
into a private arrangement); see also Frances E. Olsen, The Family and the Market: A Study of
Ideology andLegal Reform, 96 HARV. L. REv. 1497, 1536-37 n.151 (1984) ("If marriage is seen
as nothing more than what the parties agree to and if the parties' agreement is all that is
enforceable by the courts, a couple's agreement should not be less enforceable just because it
does not include formal marriage.").
42. See Morone v. Morone, 413 N.E.2d 1154, 1158 (N.Y. 1980) (validating explicit
contracts between cohabitants); see also In re Estate of Steffes, 290 N.W.2d 697, 708-09 (Wis.
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contractual principles also support a contractual argument against imposing
marriage law on cohabitants. Under the contractual argument, the choice not to
marry reflects the partners' opposition (or at least of that partner who refuses to
marry) to bear the financial burdens imposed on married persons who decide to
separate from their spouses.43 Therefore, precisely from the liberal approach,
which stresses individuals' intentions, it is appropriate to respect their decision
not to marry, and not impose upon them quasi-marital obligations.
44
This contractual argument is supported by empirical findings. 45 These
findings point to systematic differences in lifestyles between married and
cohabiting partners and suggest that married couples' level of commitment is
generally higher than that of cohabitants.46 Under the contractual argument, the
law should reflect these differences.47
The contractual argument against imposing marriage law on cohabitants
underlies the explicit contract model that was adopted in Minnesota,48
1980) (holding that contracts between unmarried cohabitants are enforceable if independent
from illicit sexual conduct); Carlson v. Olson, 256 N.W.2d 249,253 (Minn. 1977) (adopting the
views advanced in Marvin regarding the validation on cohabitation contracts).
43. See, e.g., Tapley v. Tapley, 449 A.2d 1218, 1220 (N.H. 1982) ("We realize that
couples enter into these unstructured domestic relationships in order to avoid the rights and
responsibilities that the State imposes on the marital relationship."); see also Margaret F. Brinig,
Domestic Partnership andDefault Rules, in RECONCEIVING THE FAMtLY, supra note 19, at 269,
269 ("[P]arties who did not want to get married but wanted to cohabit would find themselves
with a set of responsibilities on dissolution that they did not want to assume.").
44. See Garrison, supra note 15, at 857 ("Conscriptive cohabitation laws do 'define
attributes of personhood... under the compulsion of the State' by imposing obligations on
those who have not chosen them" (quoting Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S.
833, 851 (1992))); see also Homer H. Clark, Jr., The New Marriage, 12 WILLAMETr-E L. REv.
441,452 (1976) (stating that respect for cohabitants' freedom means avoiding legal regulation
of the status of those who have chosen not to be subject to the norms entailed by marriage).
45. See Steven L. Nock, A Comparison of Marriages and Cohabiting Relationships, 16 .
FAM. ISSUEs 53,66 (1995) (providing empirical data to support a contractual argument against
imposing marriage law on cohabitants).
46. See id. (describing substantive distinctions between the elements of cohabiting
relationships and those of married spouses, based on empirical studies); see also Milton C.
Regan, Jr., Calibrated Commitment: The Legal Treatment of Marriage and Cohabitation, 76
NoTRE DAME L. REv. 1435, 1439-40 (2001) (describing extensive sociological literature
regarding the differences between marriage and cohabitation).
47. See, e.g., Garrison, supra note 15, at 839-45 (demonstrating, through extensive
survey of sociological research, that cohabitants and married couples behave differently, and
stating that "[t]hese behavioral differences appear to reflect underlying attitudinal differences");
Brinig, supra note 43, at 274-76 (drawing on sociological research to conclude that marriage
and cohabitation are different).
48. See MiNN. STAT. ANN. § 513.075 (West 2002) (stating that under the Minnesota
Cohabitation Statutes, unless a contract such as a cohabitation agreement is in writing, a
claimant cannot maintain a cause of action to enforce the contract).
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Texas, 49 New York5° and other United States jurisdictions.5  This model
recognizes economic obligations between cohabitants only when the parties
have entered a formal written agreement, or, at a minimum, an explicit oral
agreement.
C. The Contractual Equation Between Marriage and Cohabitation
1. The Implicit Contract Model
Marvin v. Marvin52 opened the gate to applying marriage-like commitment
to cohabitants' relationships if it reflects their implied contract. 53  Great
ambiguity exists, however, as to the circumstances under which to apply the
implied contract theory.54 The common application of the implied contract
theory insists on proof of a concrete understanding between the partners-albeit
not necessarily articulated in a formal way-to apply marriage commitments to
their relationship. 55 Typical couples, however, are rarely consciously thinking
49. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 1.108 (Vernon 1998) ("A promise or agreement made on
consideration of marriage or nonmarital conjugal cohabitation is not enforceable unless the
promise or agreement is in writing and signed by the person obligated by the promise or
agreement."); see also Zaremba v. Cliburn, 949 S.W.2d 822, 829 (Tex. App. 1997) (holding that
property claims arising from nonmarital cohabitation of two male partners are subject to the
statute of frauds provision requiring written contract).
50. See, e.g., Morone v. Morone, 413 N.E.2d 1154, 1157 (N.Y. 1980) (asserting that,
upon dissolution of nonmarital living arrangement, the mutual rights of spouses "should not
exceed beyond recovery on theory of express contract").
51. See, e.g., Posik v. Layton, 695 So. 2d 759, 762 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1997) ("Because
of the potential abuse in marital-type relationships, we find that such agreements must be in
writing."); Kohler v. Flynn, 493 N.W.2d 647,649 (N.D. 1992) ("If live-in companions intend to
share property, they should express that intention in writing.").
52. See Marvin v. Marvin, 557 P.2d 106, 110 (Cal. 1976) ("In the absence of an express
contract, the courts should inquire into the conduct of the parties to determine whether that
conduct demonstrates an implied contract, agreement of partnership or joint venture, or some
other tacit understanding between the parties.").
53. See, e.g., Watts v. Watts, 405 N.W.2d 303, 316 (Wis. 1987) (holding that unmarried
cohabitants can bring claims that rest in either contract or equity such as unjust enrichment or
partition); Kozlowski v. Kozlowski, 403 A.2d 902,906 (N.J. 1979) ("Whether we designate the
agreement reached by the parties in 1968 to be express . . . or implied is of no legal
consequence. The only difference is in the nature of the proof of the agreement."). See
generally J. THOMAS OLDHAM, DIvORCE, SEPARATION, AND THE DIsTRIBuTION OF PROPERTY
§ 1.02 (2007) (listing the decisions following Marvin).
54. See Ann L. Estin, Ordinary Cohabitation, 76NOTREDAMEL. REv. 1381, 1381 (2001)
(analyzing the diversity of results under the implied contract theory).
55. See Scott, supra note 19, at 335 ("[C]ourts often conclude that the parties'
understandings were too indefinite for contractual enforcement.").
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of the legal aspects of their relationship.56 Thus, assuming implied contracts
between couples is artificial.17 Moreover, the implied contract model fails to
address the contractual argument that cohabitation without marriage reflects the
rejection of marriage laws.
58
2. The Revised Relational Contract Model
Against the background of the above critiques, a revised relational version
of the implicit contract model recently emerged. On a sociological level, the
model rejects the core premise of the contractual argument, namely that
cohabitants intentionally reject marriage law. 59 Cohabitation is often not the
outcome of a conscious decision not to marry, but rather the natural
continuation of cohabitants' existing lifestyle.60 The parties in these cases have
not rejected marriage; at most, they have not assigned it any great
significance.61 Furthermore, even when the decision not to marry initially
reflects an aversion to marriage law, one should not ignore changing
circumstances that lead cohabitants to update their life plans and mutual
commitments-albeit not in a formal way. On a legal level, the relational
contract theory,62 which suggests a unique, dynamic, informal regulation for
56. See, e.g., Brinig, supra note 43, at 272 ("While couples at the time they marry
arguably are not thinking in contract mode, it is even less likely that couples who move in
together will be doing so .... ").
57. See, e.g., Carol S. Bruch, Property Rights ofDe Facto Spouses Including Thoughts on
the Value of Homemakers'Services, 10 FAM. L.Q. 101, 135 (1976) (noting that most unwed
persons who choose to cohabit likely do so "in ignorance of the... [financial] consequences of
either marriage or nonmarriage" and "with absolutely no thought given to the legal
consequences of their relationship").
58. For a discussion of the contractual distinction between marriage and cohabitation
based on level of commitment and financial obligation at dissolution, see supra Part II.B.
59, See Blumberg, supra note 18, at 1135-56 (presenting sociological findings that reject
the thesis that a life of cohabitation reflects a repudiation of legal obligations entailed by
marriage); see also Terry S. Kogan, Competing Approaches to Same-Sex Versus Opposite-Sex,
Unmarried Couples in Domestic Partnership Laws and Ordinances, 2001 BYU L. REV. 1023,
1032-33 (2001) (explaining why a person who is willing to legalize relations with a partner
might nevertheless have reservations concerning the institution of marriage).
60. See Blumberg, supra note 22, at 1296 (arguing that a decision to cohabit, despite the
absence of the legal formality of marriage, does not signify the parties' rejection of reciprocal
economic obligation).
61. See id. (explaining that as the incidence of cohabitation increases, so too does the
significance of the parties' decision to cohabit rise).
62. Relational contract theory was originally suggested by Ian Macneil. See Ian R.
Macneil, The Many Futures of Contracts, 47 S. CAL. L. REv. 691,694-96 (1974) (proposing a
shift from viewing contracts as discrete transactions to a more dynamic relational model). For
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contracts characterized by ongoing personal relationships, 63 has the potential to
breathe new life into the implied contract model. Applying the relational theory
to cohabitants' relationships, 64 the formalism of the contractual argument should
be replaced by a relational approach that emphasizes the actual way in which the
partners' relationship developed,65 their mutual dependency, and their deviation
from initial intentions, even if the parties did not articulate them explicitly.
66
Thus, according to this relational version of the contractual model, which has
been unofficially adopted by few courts,67 the implied contract is not limited to a
concrete and specified understanding regarding the legal aspects of the
relationship; rather, it is based on a broader understanding between the partners
regarding their mutual commitment.68 Going one step further in this direction,
Professor Elizabeth Scott recently suggested that the law should presume a
contractual obligation to apply marriage law in the case of couples that have lived
together for more than five years.69
further development of the theory, see generally Charles J. Goetz & Robert E. Scott, Principles
of Relational Contracts, 67 VA. L. REv. 1089 (1981), and Robert E. Scott, Conflict and
Cooperation in Long-Term Contracts, 75 CAL. L. REv. 2005 (1987). Relational contract theory
has become the subject of extensive scholarship. See, e.g., Symposium in Honor of Ian R.
MacNeil: Relational Contract Theory: Unanswered Questions, 94 Nw. U. L. REv. 737,737-
936 (2000) (collecting articles on relational contract theory from participants in a symposium
held in honor of Ian Macneil).
63. See, e.g., Macneil, supra note 62, at 720-21 (distinguishing between relational
contracts, which address long-term personal relationships, and discrete transactional contracts,
which deal with an isolated transaction between two strangers).
64. See Scott, supra note 19, at 331-33 (providing the first trial to systematically apply
the relational theory to cohabitation law); cf Ellman, supra note 18, 1377-78 (stating that
relational contract theory supports status-based regulation of the cohabitation relationship).
65. See Ian R. Macneil, Contracts: Adjustment of Long-Term Economic Relations Under
Classical, Neoclassical, and Relational Contract Law, 72 Nw. U. L. REV. 854, 895-98 (1978)
(comparing the regulation of long-term contracts according to classical, modem, and relational
contract theory). But cf Robert E. Scott, The Case for Formalism in Relational Contract, 94
Nw. U. L. REv. 847, 871-75 (2000) (arguing for the place of formalism even in relational
contracts).
66. See Robert A. Hillman, Court Adjustment of Long-Term Contracts: An Analysis
Under Modern Contract Law, 1987 DUKE L.J. 1, 17 (arguing for a duty to adjust to promote
contractual flexibility and cooperation among parties).
67. See Scott, supra note 19, at 335 ("[A] few courts have implicitly suggested that living
together in a long-term marriage-like union is evidence of the parties' intentions to undertake
marriage like sharing of property.... ."); see also Hay v. Hay, 678 P.2d 672, 673-75 (Nev.
1984) (applying community property law to cohabitants based on the purpose, duration, and
stability of the relationship and on the expectations of the parties).
68. See Ellman, supra note 18, at 1374 ("Contractual obligations are discrete while social
obligations are embedded in a larger relationship on which they depend for their existence and
meaning.").
69. See Scott, supra note 19, at 343 ("A cohabitation period of at least five years, for
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D. The Status Model Equation Between Marriage and Cohabitation
The status model goes one step beyond the contractual models and applies
marriage-like commitments to cohabitants, without the need to argue for explicit
or implied contract. It is based on three main arguments.
1. The Extra-Contractual Argument
The status model contests the contractual model with extra-contractual
considerations. These include equitable considerations aimed at fairness,
70
gender equality,71 concern for children,7 2 and the prevention of exploitation.
73
Those who equate marriage and cohabitation assume that these relationships
differ in their formal form but involve substantially the same functional
characterization of marriage.74 Under this functional view,75 using the formal
differences between the institutions as the sole reason for denying marriage law
remedies to the weaker partner in a cohabitation relationship is simply unjust. 76
example, supports a presumption that the relationship was marriage-like and also discourages
opportunistic and marginal claims.").
70. See, e.g., SUSAN M. OKIN, JUSTICE, GENDER, AND THE FAMILY 170-86 (1989)
(suggesting a fairness account of marital law).
71. See, e.g., Jana B. Singer, Divorce Reform and Gender Justice, 67 N.C. L. REv. 1103,
1113-21 (1989) (comparing various methods of post-divorce property allocation as a return on
the wife's marital investment).
72. See Shahar Lifshitz, The Best Interests of the Child and Spousal Laws, in THE CASE
FOR THE CHILD: TOWARD A NEw AGENDA 45, 64-66 (Ya'ir Ronen & Charles W. Greenbaum
eds., 2008) (calling for child-oriented regulation of spousal law).
73. See Blumberg, supra note 18, at 1159-70 (arguing that, due to female cohabitants'
unequal bargaining power, a marital status model of the relationship may be more appropriate
than a contractual model).
74. See Regan, supra note 46, at 1437 (describing anti-formalist objections to the
distinction between marriage and cohabitation).
75. See Martha Minow, Redefining Families: Who's in and Who's Out?, 62 U. CoLO. L.
REv. 269,270 (1991) (arguing for legal recognition of functional families outside of traditional
legal categories, including adult couples in informal unions).
76. The main proponents of extra-contractual consideration are Grace Blumberg and Ira
Ellman. See Blumberg, supra note 18, at 1163 (supporting cohabitation law regulation based on
fairness and protection of the weaker party); Blumberg, supra note 22, at 1297 (same); Ellman,
supra note 18, at 1367 (criticizing the contractual perspective of cohabitation law); see also
LAW COMM'N OF CAN., BEYOND CONJUGAUTY: RECOGNIZING AND SUPPORTING CLOSE PERSONAL
ADULT RELATIONSHIPS 24 (2001) ("Parliament's goal is to achieve some other outcome-like
the support of children, the recognition of economic interdependence, the prevention of
exploitation-that is connected to, but not exactly congruent with, the marriage relationship.").
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2. The Power Gap Argument
The sensitivity of modem contract law 77 to the unequal bargaining positions
of the parties 78 further undermines the power of the contractual argument. The
contractual argument rests on the implicit premise that the choice not to get
married is a joint decision of equal partners.79 While this equality premise
corresponds to an idealist vision of a utopian world, it is far from reflecting the
concrete gender reality. In the real world, big differences exist between men and
women in their economic capacity, business experience, patterns of negotiation
management, 80 and status in the marriage market.81 Consequently, the choice not
to marry reflects, in many cases, a unilateral decision of the more powerful
82 83partner, rather than a joint decision of both parties.
77. See MORTON J. HORwITz, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAw 1870-1960: THE
CRISIS OF LEGAL ORTHODOXY 33-63 (1992) (describing the modem model of contract law).
78. Modem contract law doctrines of economic duress and unconscionability, as well as
specific legislation in areas of law such as consumer, labor, and banking, are sensitive to cases
of disparities of power between the parties of a contract. See U.C.C. § 2-302 (2003)
(unconscionability); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §§ 175, 176 (1981) (economic
duress); id § 208 (unconscionability). Thus, these doctrines allow the courts to intervene in the
content of the contract, in cases in which there is concern that inequality between the parties has
been exploited by one of them in the course of establishing the contract. See, e.g., M.J.
Trebilcock, The Doctrine of Inequality of Bargaining Power, 26 U. TORONTO L.J. 359, 359
(1976) ("[M]any ofthe traditional defenses to contract enforcement, for example, duress, undue
influence, breach of fiduciary duty, were properly seen as merely exemplary of a general
doctrine of 'unequal bargaining power."').
79. See Blumberg, supra note 18, at 1161 (noting that women have obtained formal legal
equality with men only recently and may never achieve complete social and financial equality).
80. See, e.g., Marcia A. Neave, Resolving the Dilemma ofDifference: A Critique of"The
Role of Private Ordering in Family Law," 44 U. TORONTO L.J. 97, 112-13 (1994) (explaining
how differences between men and women, both in financial circumstance and in negotiation
patterns, make private ordering dangerous for women); see also Amy L. Wax, Bargaining in the
Shadow of the Market: Is There a Future for Egalitarian Marriage?, 84 VA. L. REV. 509,560-
64 (1998) (offering a pessimistic description of the possibility of equality between men and
women in the spousal context).
81. See, e.g., Wax, supra note 80, at 565-75 (describing factors that affect marital
equality, in both traditional and dual-earner marriages).
82. See, e.g., ALI, supra note 6, at 916-18 (arguing that cohabitation reflects strong social
or economic inequality between the partners, which allows the stronger partner to resist the
weaker partner's preference for marriage).
83. Sociological research points to gaps in power similar to marriage in cohabitants'
relationships. See Rebecca Stafford et al., The Division of Labor Among Cohabiting and
Married Couples, 39 J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 43, 53-54 (1977) (describing unequal division of
tasks and lifestyles within cohabitation); see also Michael D. Newcomb, Cohabitation,
Marriage, and Divorce Among Adolescents and Young Adults, 3 J. SOC. & PERS. RELATIONSHIPS
473, 485 (1986) (finding that female cohabitants reported a lower quality of life and were far
less happy than their noncohabiting counterparts).
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3. The Same-Sex Couples Argument
The last argument focuses on same-sex couples that are unable to marry in
most United States jurisdictions. 84 It argues that in those cases, the basic
assumption of the contractual argument-namely that life as cohabitants reflects a
couple's rejection of marriage law-is not relevant.85 The case of same-sex
couples has been a dominant force in the movement to equate marriage and
cohabitation regulation.86
4. The Status Model in Existing Jurisdictions
Aside from the implied and expressed contract theories, American courts, at
times, apply complementary extra-contractual doctrines,87 such as restitution, 8
unjust enrichment, 89 and constructive trust9 to compensate cohabitants for their
84. Until the 2008 elections, two American states (Massachusetts and California) validated same
sex marriage. See In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384,433 (Cal. 2008) (mandating same-sex marriage
because domestic partnership with the same rights and benefits but without the title "marriage" is not
equal to marriage); In re Opinion of Justices to Senate, 802 N.E.2d 565, 569-71 (Mass. 2004) (stating
that civil unions with the same rights and benefits but without the title "marriage" would not be equal
to marriage); Goodridge v. Dep't of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 969 (Mass. 2003) (mandating
marnage-equivalent unions for same-sex couples). But after the 2008 elections in California, a ban on
same-sex marriage was voted in. Jesse McKinley & Laurie Goodstein, Bans in 3 States on Gay
Marriage, N.Y. TMEs, Nov. 6,2008, at Al.
85. See, e.g., Kogan, supra note 59, at 1031 (urging that the "Equality Position" adopted byALl
is most defensible in terms of the long-term interests of gay and lesbian people).
86. See, e.g., Blumberg, supra note 18, at 1268-69 ("[S]ame-sex couples have been the
dominant force in the movement to regularize nonmarital cohabitation."); Scott, supra note 3, at 238
("Today, the most compelling arguments against privileging marriage over nonmarital unions are made
on behalf of same-sex couples.").
87. See Watts v. Watts, 405 N.W.2d 303, 313 (Wis. 1987) ("Unlike claims for breach of an
express or implied in fact contract, a claim of unjust enrichment... is grounded on the moral principle
that one who has received a benefit has a duty to make restitution where retaining such a benefit would
be unjust.").
88. For a discussion of restitution in the context of informal intimacy, see generally HANOCH
DAGAN, THE LAw AND EThics oF REsTnTImON 164-209 (2004).
89. See Robert C. Casad, Unmarried Couples and Unjust Enrichment: From Staus to Contract
andBackAgain?, 77 MIcH. L. REv. 47,55 (1978) ("[R]etaining the benefit ofservices maybe unjust if
one cohabitant performed them for the other because of a fundamental mistake."); Jeffrey L. Oakes,
Comment, Article 2298, the Codification of the Principle Forbidding Unjust Enrichment, and the
Elimination of Quantum Meruit as a BasisforRecovery in Louisiana, 56 LA. L. REv. 873,903 (1996)
(stating that recovery for unjust enrichment can be determined by considering "the amount of the
defendant's enrichment, the amount of the plaintiff's impoverishment, and a causal connection
between the two").
90. See, e.g., Shuraleffv. Donnelly, 817 P.2d 764,768 (Or. Ct. App. 1991) ("[The division of
property here should recognize the parties' efforts over 15 years of cohabitation to build a future
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contribution to their partners' wealth. Yet, while these doctrines can lead to
partial rulings in favor of the non-wealthy partner, they never result in a general
equation of marriage and cohabitation.91
The American Law Institute (ALI) recently offered new principles that
reflect a dramatic shift.92 Motivated by the extra-contractual consideration and
supported by the same-sex argument,93 ALI rejects both Marvin's implied
contract model and the explicit contract model.94 Instead, ALl establishes a series
of criteria relating to the sociological and psychological components of marital
ties,95 and asserts that if these conditions are fulfilled, marriage law should be
applied.96 In addition, according to ALI, cohabitants who want to opt out of
marriage commitments need a written agreement, which are subject to strict
judicial review.97 The combination of these legal steps indicates that the
regulation of the relations between cohabitants is shifting from a contractual
model to one of status.98 Even before ALT, the Washington Supreme Court,99
together based on the contributions ofboth. That can be accomplished only by including assets held in
each party's name alone.").
91. For the narrow application of the unjust enrichment doctrine in the context of spousal law,
see for example, Estin, supra note 54, at 1400. "The case law of cohabitation makes it clear that courts
will not order compensation for services performed by one partner that can be characterized as part of
the ordinary give-and-take of a shared life." Id.; see also Tarry v. Stewart, 649 N.E.2d 1, 5 (Ohio Ct.
App. 1994) (refusing cohabitant's reimbursement claim for improvements made to house due to
benefit received from living in house during relationship); Tapley v. Tapley, 449 A.2d 1218, 1219-20
(N.H. 1982) (refusing to compensate cohabitant partner for daily life services).
92. See ALI, supra note 6, at 907-43 (discussing the financial claims of domestic partners
against one another at the termination of their relationship).
93. See id at 914 ("[T]here are domestic partners who are not allowed to marry each other
under state law because they are of the same sex, although they are otherwise eligible to marry and
would marry one another if the law allowed them to do so.").
94. See id. at 918-19 (describing the increase in the number of unmarried cohabiting
heterosexual couples and explaining that U.S. courts generally use contract law to resolve disputes).
95. See id. at 916-37 (explaining how to determine whether cohabitants are "domestic
partners").
96. See id. at 916-41 (providing guidelines on defining domestic partnership property and
allocating this property after dissolution).
97. For a discussion of the fairness ofjudicial review of cohabitants' agreements to opt out of
equal division at dissolution, see infra note 287.
98. See Garrison, supra note 15, at837 (noting that the ALI Principles, like marriage laws, rely
on a status classification).
99. See Connell v. Francisco, 898 P.2d 831, 836 (Wash. 1995) (applying a rebuttable
presumption in favor of a just and equitable distribution of property following a meretricious
relationship); Marriage of Lindsey, 678 P.2d 328, 331 (Wash. 1984) (adopting a general rule requiring
a just and equitable distribution of property following a meretricious relationship).
1583
66 WASH. &LEE L. REV 1565 (2009)
as well as legislatures and courts outside the United States, had adopted a
status approach.'1°
My analysis of the existing approaches is summarized in the following
table:
Table I: Summary of the Existing Approaches
Representative Ideology Distinction Validity of
Representave_ Ideology_ /Equation Contract
Moral
Status Hostility to Invalidation
Distinction Traditional Cohabitants, of Even
Between Stnce Public- Distinction Explicit





Distinction Minnesota Contractual Explicit
Between Tei es Conttualio Oral/Written
Marriage and The NY Cases Argument Distinction Agreements
Cohabitation (The Explicit to Apply
Contract Model) Marriage
Law
100. In New Zealand, for example, financial support and property division claims are recognized
when unions of three years' duration dissolve. See Property (Relationships) Amendment Act, 2001,
§ 2E (N.Z.) (defining relations of short duration as those that last less than three years); see also LAW
COMM'N OF CAN., supra note 76, at 33 ("Individuals in close personal relationships who are not
married... may have many of the characteristics of economic and emotional interdependency that
ought to give rise to rights and responsibilities."). For the Israeli court's trend toward equating
marriage and cohabitation, see Shahar Lifshitz, A Potential Lessonfrom the Israeli Experiencefor the
American Same-Sex Marriage Debate, 22 BYU J. PUn. L. 359, 372-75 nn.65-83 (2008). See also
Blumberg, supra note 22, at 1299-302 for a comparative survey of legal regimes that adopt the status
model.
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Representative Ideolo Distinction Validity of
Rersntv Ielgy /Equation Contract
Validation
Original Marvin Implied Depends on Agreements
and Most of Its Contract the Existence BetweenContractual Followers Tory of Implied Cohabitants
Equation of Followers Theory Contract Either to
Marriage and Apply or to
Cohabitation A Few Marvin Relational Reject




AgreementStatus Extra- to Opt Out
Eqatio Washington Contractual, of Marriage
Equation of New-Zealand Power Gap Equation Law but





E. The Need for a New Theory
Our discussion thus far has demonstrated three central points. First,
liberal-contractual considerations-such as state neutrality, freedom of choice,
and freedom of contract-oppose the traditional status approach, which
invalidates even explicit contracts under which cohabitants assume marriage-
like commitments. Second, the explicit contract model and its underlying
contractual argument expose the non-liberal aspects of imposing marriage
commitments on cohabitants. Third, the relational contract, the status models,
and the underlying rationales of each, demonstrate the extremely problematic
nature of regulating cohabitation law solely on the basis of the explicit
contractual model.
So, as is often assumed by legal scholars, do the relational contract and
status models settle the debate in favor of equating marriage and cohabitation?
My analysis suggests that they do not. I evaluate the equating models (the
relational contract and the status) and argue that even if persuasive to some
degree, they fail to defy the essence of the contractual argument against
equating marriage and cohabitation. I further demonstrate that, ironically, the
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relational contract and the status model that developed as alternatives to the
explicit contract model fall into the same traps as the explicit contract model.
Thus, none of the existing theories provides an adequate solution to the
problems of cohabitants.
1. Limitations of the Contractual Approaches
Let us begin with the contractual models (the implied and revised-
relational) for equation marriage and cohabitation.' 0 ' These models criticize
the explicit contractual model for its factual premise that cohabitation always
reflects conscious rejection of marriage law. Against this premise, they present
alternative scenarios in which cohabitation does not reflect rejection of
marriage law but rather relational agreement to apply marriage commitments.
0 2
Yet, even those who believe that, in certain instances, cohabitation relationships
reflect such implied or relational contracts cannot ignore the fact that, in other
cases, refraining from marriage indeed reflects a conscious rejection of
marriage and its legal consequences or that, in yet other cases, cohabitation
serves as a kind of trial period prior to marriage. Therefore, just as it would be
problematic to apply the explicit contract model to all cohabitants, so too is it
problematic to adopt the opposite policy, which ignores those cohabitants who
rejected-or at least have not yet taken on-legal marital commitments.
Normatively, the implied and relational contract models are limited also to
the contractual arrangements of the partners and ignore extra-contractual
considerations. 103 Thus, these models are also exposed to the power gap and
extra-contractual arguments. Friedman v. Friedman,'°4 a California case,
might clarify this concern. Friedman involved cohabitants who had lived
together for twenty years and raised two children. 10 5 When they separated, the
woman sued for maintenance and division of assets. 10 6 The appeals court found
101. See supra Part II.B-C (discussing the different reasons motivating couples to choose
cohabitation instead of marriage).
102. See supra notes 59-62 and accompanying text (discussing the relational contract
model's criticisms of the explicit contractual model).
103. See Ellman, supra note 18, at 1375 ("The point here is that the successful marriage,
and by extension the successful domestic partnership, is not based upon the parties' compliance
with any agreement explicit enough in its terms for the law sensibly to treat it as a contract. The
successful intimate relationship is reciprocal, but not contractual.").
104. See Friedman v. Friedman, 24 Cal. Rptr. 2d 892,900-01 (Ct. App. 1993) (finding that
the trial court's order granting temporary relief to the nonmarital partner of the appellant
constituted an abuse of discretion).
105. Id. at 894-95.
106. Id. at 893.
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insufficient evidence to support the claim that an implied contract existed
between the man and the woman, instead finding that "the record discloses that
the parties specifically chose to live together 'without any sanction by the
State."' 107 Consequently, it was not possible to infer an implied contract and
apply marriage laws to this relationship. 08
The contractual approaches enable a powerful spouse to opt out from
marriage commitments either by contractual arrangement or even by clear
unilateral notification that she does not agree to take upon herself marriage
commitments. 1°9 Friedman, thus, followed contractual logic. However, is the
Friedman conclusion justified? Does the contractual argument completely
exhaust the discussion on this question? Might the weaker party's claim be
supported by extra-contractual considerations, such as her contribution (by
caring for the home and the children) to the production of income and the
enrichment of the family unit, considerations of gender equality, concern for the
children, and other considerations?' ° Do not these alternative arguments call
for a revised model that takes into account both contractual and extra-
contractual considerations?
2. Limitations of the Status Approach
Interestingly, the status model is subject to similar critiques regarding the
narrow perspectives of its factual and legal premises.
First, the status model also focuses on a specific type of cohabitants."'
This type is characterized by a power gap and even exploitation. It argues
correctly that in such patterns of relationship, cohabitation does not reflect
mutual agreement to reject marriage law, but rather unilateral decision of the
powerful spouse to take advantage of marital life without marital
107. Id. at 899.
108. See id. ("The record before us discloses no conduct on the part of the parties from
which it can be implied that the parties (particularly appellant) intended to promise that
respondent would be supported as if she and appellant had actually been married if the
relationship ended.").
109. But cf Scott, supra note 19, at 344 (demanding formal written agreement to opt out in
order to protect the vulnerable party).
110. For a similar criticism, see Ellman, supra note 18, at 1370.
111. See e.g., Scott, supra note 3, at 250 ("[T]he A.L.I. domestic partnership status
promises to provide greater financial protection to dependent parties in informal unions than is
currently available. It will mitigate real hardship and unfairness by enforcing expectations in
long-term marriage-like unions and by discouraging exploitation by parties with greater
financial sophistication and resources.").
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commitments. 12  Yet, this model overlooks cases in which cohabitation
situations are not the result of a power gap but rather a joint decision of
egalitarian couples. It also ignores cases in which one partner honestly clarified
to the other at the beginning of the relationship--before inducing reliance-that
she does not want to take on marriage law commitments, which the other
partner eventually accepted." 1
3
Second, the contractual models are criticized justifiably for their exclusive
focus on the partners' implied or explicit agreement. Yet, even if the parties'
wishes should not serve as the decisive consideration of cohabitant law, neither
should they be ignored without justification. In those cases in which
justification is missing, the contractual argument against imposition of marital
obligations on partners that rejected marriage is still valid.
Furthermore, even the gender equality perspective, which was a core
element of the power gap arguments for equating marriage and cohabitation,
does not justify the status model. Apparently, the need to protect women might
justify the deviation from the express or implied agreement between the
partners in the appropriate cases. Yet, the paternalistic assumption that women
in spousal relationships are always the weaker partners-and are therefore in
need of legal protection-clashes with the modem view that women and men
are equals. Lawmakers, thus, must develop a model that protects women
without the implicit harm to their agency. So far, neither the contractual
models nor the status model meet this challenge."
14
The narrow perspective of the status model becomes even clearer when
viewed through the perspective of the same-sex couple's argument." 5 This
112. See id. at 263 ("The A.L.I. approach assumes that financially vulnerable partners
would always choose no relationship over a relationship without financial security; in fact, some
may prefer a shared life without financial sharing.").
113. See id. at 250 ("Thus, at least implicitly, the Principles take the normative position
that cohabiting couples should not be free to choose lasting unions of limited interdependency
and commitment.").
114. The description of the tension between the need to protect women as the weaker
economic side of a couple and the need to reflect a message of equality is very typical in modem
family law. See DEBORAH L. RHODE, JUSTICE AND GENDER: SEx DISCRIMINATION AND THE LAW
305-15 (1989) (describing the tension between "sameness" feminism which presumes actual
equality between men and women and "difference" feminism which takes difference between
men and women into consideration); see also MARTHA MINOw, MAKING ALL THE DIFFERENCE:
INCLUSION, EXCLUSION, AND AMERICAN LAw 373-90 (1990) (suggesting a model of difference
feminism). While in other contexts there are some proposals to balance between the positions,
in the case of cohabitants so far, each argument and model takes an extreme position.
115. See Scott, supra note 3, at 228 ("This group [of same-sex couples] does not challenge
the privileged status of marriage, but rather argues that, as long as the special status continues,
same-sex couples should have the right to enjoy the tangible benefits that marriage confers, as
well as its symbolic social importance.").
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argument refutes the premise that cohabitation always reflects no commitments.
This claim, however, is relevant only to those couples, like same-sex couples,
who are not qualified to get married. Yet, the case of same-sex couples has
been a dominant force in the movement to equate marriage and cohabitation
regulation in general.
Thus, notwithstanding the significant problems underlying the contractual
model of cohabitation, it is not clear that the appropriate solution is to replace
that model with a status model that imposes marriage law on all cohabitants.
3. Intermediate Summary
Our journey through the existing approaches demonstrates several flaws
common to all approaches. First, each model focuses on one subgroup of
cohabitants but ignores or denies the existence of other groups. What is needed
is a richer model that responds to different subgroups of cohabitants. Second,
the various strata of discussion between the existing approaches demonstrate
that the regulation of the economic relationship between cohabitants is a
complex matter that requires balancing among a variety of considerations and
arguments. At least at the present stage, each approach is too focused on a
specific type of consideration; thus, none of the existing approaches offers a
suitable balance.
Given the disadvantages of the existing approaches, the original
motivation for offering a new theory was to suggest a number of principles that
could serve as a framework for integrating the partial viewpoints that were
raised. The pluralist theory that is the product of my efforts, however, goes far
beyond integrating and balancing the existing approaches and arguments. As
the following text demonstrates, this theory offers an innovative and unique
perspective on cohabitation law, and, on a broader level, on the regulation of
spousal relationships in general.
111. Toward a Pluralist Approach to Cohabitation Law
Despite the substantive differences between them, the existing approaches
are trapped in the following dichotomy. According to one option, despite the
formal differences between them, cohabitation and marriage relationships are
substantively identical;"6 thus, the law should equate their regulation.
116. See supra notes 74-75 and accompanying text (discussing the anti-formalism case).
Both contractual and status approaches share this view. For an explanation of the contractual
perspective, see Garrison, supra note 15, at 835. "The commitment argument would, of course,
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According to a second option, cohabitation and marriage are different.
Marriage reflects a greater commitment between the parties, 17 and, hence,
should be encouraged from the public perspective by distinguishing marriage
and cohabitation regulation." 18 What is missing in the current discourse is a
third option, which treats and designs marriage and cohabitation as two equally
respected options and yet distinguishes their regulation. This is exactly the
vision of the pluralist approach that is expressed in this Part. In what follows, I
describe the rationales supporting the pluralist distinction between marriage and
cohabitation. From these rationales, I draw the principles of the cohabitation
institution, and, finally, I outline a model for a pluralist regulation of
cohabitation.
A. The Pluralist Case for Distinguishing Marriage and Cohabitation
This Part offers three related, and yet separate, arguments in support of a
distinction between marriage and cohabitation.
1. The Channeling Perspective: Marriage as an Ex Ante
Screening Mechanism
Similar to the contractual argument, the first argument for pluralist
distinction comes from the liberal perspective of individual rights and argues
for the right of spouses to choose their preferred type of spousal relationship.
Yet, instead of the contractual ex post reflective approach, the pluralist view
offers a forward-looking approach, allowing couples to choose, ex ante, their
preferred model among a variety of legal institutions.
depend on a showing that most cohabitants view their relationships as marital and intend to
assume marital obligations; without such a showing, marriage and cohabitation could not fairly
be treated as equivalent." Id. For an articulation from the status perspective, see ALl, supra
note 6, at 914-15. "[T]he absence of formal marriage may have little or no bearing on the
character of the parties' domestic relationship and on the equitable considerations that underlie
claims between lawful spouses at the dissolution of a marriage." Id.
117. See supra notes 46-47 and accompanying text (providing empirical support of the
contractual argument).
118. See Garrison, supra note 15, at 861 ("Given the substantial benefits associated with
marriage, family law should clearly signal that marital commitment matters and promote
reliance on such commitment."); see also Lynn D. Wardle, Is Marriage Obsolete?, 10 MICH. J.
GENDER & L. 189, 214 (2003) ("While marriage and family relations are far from perfect, they
are incomparably superior to any other model of a companionate or nurturing relationship.").
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The existing contractual approaches are reflective. They are concerned
with gaps between the legal regulation of the economic relationship and the
couple's hypothetical wishes.119 Driven by this concern, the contractual
approaches adopt one of two strategies. The first strategy demands that the
courts inquire into the wishes of the parties in accord with the specific
circumstances of the case.' 20 In many cases, this strategy leads to uncertainty
and is also invasive.' 2' The second strategy adopts, as a default, a rule that
reflects the presumed wishes of the majority of couples. 22 In light of this
strategy, a substantive part of the debate between the competing approaches is
actually factual, revolving around what are deemed typical expectations of
cohabitants. Each side of this debate is backed by sociological research
123
aiming to prove that one kind of cohabitant's legal expectations are
prototypical, and to deny-or at least undermine-the existence of other kinds
of cohabitants' expectations.
24
By contrast, impressed with the data presented by both sides of this heated
debate, the pluralist approach begins with a pluralist observation that in our
society, a variety of spousal relationships exist, characterized by different levels
and stages of commitments. Thus, any default rule almost inevitably would fail
to fulfill the expectations of all kinds of cohabitants. Instead of viewing this
failure to express the wishes of the parties as a fault, the pluralist approach
119. See, e.g., Brinig, supra note 43, at 277 ("In sum, by using a default rule that is not
what people would most likely agree to in advance, as the ALl proposes to do, we force those
who do not want this type of relationship into contract-mode."). For a broader context, see
Robert E. Scott, The Case for Market Damages: Revisiting the Lost Profits Puzzle, 57 U. Cm. L.
REv. 1155, 1173 (1990). "The state has no desire to impose its default rules on unwilling
parties." Id.
120. Marvin and its original implied contract theory are a typical example for this strategy.
See Marvin v. Marvin, 557 P.2d 106, 122 (Cal. 1976) ("We add that in the absence of an
express agreement, the courts may look to a variety of other remedies in order to protect the
parties' lawful expectations.").
121. For my previous critique of the implied contract theory, see supra notes 55-57 and
accompanying text.
122. See Garrison, supra note 15, at 848 ("Black-letter rules and presumptions should fit
the typical case, not the atypical."); see also Robert E. Scott, A Relational Theory of Default
Rules for Commercial Contracts, 19 J. LEGAL STUD. 597, 606-13 (1990) (arguing for the
majoritarian default rule).
123. Compare supra notes 46-47 (providing empirical research supporting the explicit
contract model for distinction between marriage and cohabitation), with supra notes 52-60
(detailing the empirical support of the relational contract model for equation).
124. See Brinig, supra note 43, at 270 ("The problem, as noted above, is that the Principles
propose a default that no one wants."); see also Garrison, supra note 15, at 847-48 ("[T]he
existence of some, relatively rare cases of marriage-like cohabitation does not justify the
imposition of conscriptive rules on the vast majority of cohabitants whose relationships are not
marriage-like.").
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views it as an opportunity to influence the preferences and expectations of
cohabitants' partners.
25
Taking into account the potential influence of cohabitation law on
cohabitants' preferences, the pluralist approach deviates from the pure
reflective ex post position of the contractual approaches and focuses on the ex
ante channeling function of cohabitation law.' 26 According to this view, the
law should actively design the social institution of cohabitation 27 as a distinct
institution separate from marriage, and it should channel couples to express
their ex ante preference regarding the institution that best fits their relationship.
The formal-and currently underestimated-requirement of registering
marriage serves as a screening mechanism between the different types of
spousal relationships.
128
The pluralist approach's use of the channeling aspect of cohabitation law
is quite unique. Most of the existing applications of the family law's
channeling function belong to the perfectionist philosophical tradition, 129 which
prefers one type of family life to another, and directs couples to the preferable
spousal pattern. 130 In contrast, the pluralist approach posits marriage and
125. See Stevan J. Burton, Default Principles, Legitimacy andtheAuthority ofa Contract,
3 S. CAL. INTERDIsc. L.J. 115, 139-40 (1993) (analyzing the influence of default rules on social
legitimacy); cf. Alan Schwartz, The Default Rule Paradigm and the Limits of Contract Law, 3
S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 389, 415-19 (1994) (arguing that the contractual remedy will ultimately
define the parties' expectations). See generally Russell B. Korobkin, The Status Quo Bias and
Contract Default Rules, 83 CORNELL L. REv. 608 (1998) (explaining the sociological and
psychological mechanisms by which default rules influence the parties' preferences and
expectations).
126. See Schneider, supra note 25, at 529 ("[T]he channelling function serves the valuable,
the necessary, goal of shaping and promoting the social institutions of family life."); see also
Trebilcock, supra note 78, at 252 ("I am attracted by the idea of the legal system making
available to prospective partners a quite limited set of ex ante options, in order to maximize the
signaling value of these options.... ").
127. See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, Social Norms and Social Roles, 96 COLUM. L. REv. 903,
947-52 (1996) (analyzing the role of the law in building social institutions).
128. Cf Lon Fuller, Consideration and Form, 41 COLUM. L. REv. 799, 801-03 (1941)
(arguing that one of the functions of formalism in contract law is to provide a simple external
test of an intention by the parties to undertake a particular set of legally enforceable
obligations).
129. See Stephen Gardbaum, Liberalism, Autonomy, and Moral Conflict, 48 STAN. L. REV.
385,391-404 (1996) (comparing the neutral account of freedom with the perfectionist one).
130. See Schneider, supra note 25, at 505-12 (discussing the channeling function of family
law); Linda C. McClain, Love, Marriage, and the Baby Carriage: Revisiting the Channeling
Function of Family Law, 28 CARDozO L. REv. 2133, 2134-37 (2007) (same); see also Scott,
supra note 3, at 229 ("In my fiamework, the government is justified in channeling intimate
relationships into marriage because formal unions function as a useful means of providing care
in a family setting." (emphasis added)). In this light, the traditional status model and its
contemporary progeny distinguish marriage and cohabitation in order to express marriage's
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cohabitation as equally respectable institutions and expects the partners to
choose between them according to their real preferences.
31
2. The Autonomy-Based Rationale for Pluralism
The channeling perspective justifies the distinction between marriage and
cohabitation as a screening mechanism that enables couples to express ex ante
their choice between varieties of existing social institutions. But the pluralist
approach goes one step further. It demands that the law help in the design and
creation of a variety of spousal options. Thus, according to the pluralist
approach, even in a hypothetical Tabula Rasa society-that is, a society without
a legal concept of marriage-the law should develop a concept of marriage, and
differentiate between the legal status of married couples and cohabitants in
order to support the diversity of spousal lifestyles.
Philosophically, the pluralist theory is based on modem liberal approaches
that stress the idea that individual autonomy means not only the absence of
formal limitations on the individual's choices (as negative-passive liberals
suggest), but also the existence of a range of options from which to choose.1
32
This approach emphasizes the duty of the liberal state to create a diversity of
social institutions that enable the individual to make genuine and meaningful
choices between various alternatives.
133
The application of these modem liberal approaches to cohabitation law
leads to surprising conclusions. Think of a world in which the law
distinguishes between marriage and cohabitation. In such a world, a couple in
a relationship may choose between a high level of legal commitment (legal
advantage.
131. See Shahar Lifshitz, A Liberal Analysis of Western Cohabitation Law 13 (Bar-Ilan
Univ. Pub. Law and Legal Theory Working Paper No. 07-09, 2009), available at
http://ssm.com/abstract=1352045 ("What is missing in the current discourse is a third option
which refers to and designs marriage and cohabitation as two equally respected options while
still distinguishing their regulation.").
132. See JOSEPH RAz, THE MORALITY OF FREEDOM 369-429 (1986) (designing a modem
liberal theory based on the principles of freedom and individual autonomy).
133. See RAz, supra note 12, at 179-93 (supporting the idea of the state playing an active
role, which stems from his liberal account of autonomy); see also Gardbaun, supra note 129, at
392 ("Political liberalism views the conflict between individual choice and various alternative
bases as a central fact in the fact of reasonable pluralism and accordingly requires state
neutrality on the issue."); cf. WILL KYMLICKA, LIBERALISM, COMMUNITY AND CULTURE 207-19
(1989) (asserting that the state should respect the autonomy of minority communities so as to
enhance the diversity of society).
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marriage) and a lower level (cohabitation). Such a framework offers
individuals a range of options.
On the other hand, think of a legal world totally in accord with the
(supposedly) liberal position equating the legal status of cohabitants with that
of married couples. In such a world, couples who desire to maintain spousal
relationships are subject automatically to the system of marriage laws. Such a
framework does not offer couples social institutions with meaningful
differences and the possibility to make genuine choices.
3. The Efficiency Perspective: Pluralism and the Signaling Function of
Marriage
Beyond its intrinsic value, the diversity of the spousal institution that the
pluralist approach suggests is supported also by an efficiency analysis.
Efficiency analysis emphasizes the function of marriage as a social institution
34
that enables a person to pre-commit herself and hence to signal to her spouse,
children, and society as a whole the scope and seriousness of her
commitment. 135 The pluralist approach argues that legal differences between
the mutual commitments of married and cohabitating partners are vital for this
"signaling" effect because it enables the couples to signal their readiness to take
their commitment to a higher level. 136 Even if, however, the commitments of
married couples and cohabitants were equalized, the marriage commitments
still are going to be imposed on spouses automatically. The marriage itself,
thus, would not add new commitments, obscuring the signaling effect of
marriage.
134. See, e.g., Russell D. Murphy, Jr., A Good Man Is Hard to Find: Marriage as an
Institution, 47 J. EcoN. BEHAVIOR & ORG. 27 (2002) (explaining the role of marriage as a social
institution that reflects a system of cultural understandings).
135. See, e.g., William Bishop, "Is He Married?": Marriage as Information, 34 U.
TORONTO L.J. 245, 245 (1984) ("These two encounters suggested to me that many of the
important functions of marriage in modem society can be explained by an economic model-in
particular by the model of market signaling."); see also Michael J. Trebilcock, Marriage as
Signal, in THE FALL AND RISE OF FREEDOM OF CONTRACT 245,248-55 (F.H. Buckley ed., 1999)
(explaining through various disciplines how marriage reflects a message or in economic
terminology signals a high level of commitment by the couple); David D. Haddock & Daniel D.
Polsby, Family as a Rational Classification, 74 WASH. U. L.Q. 15, 32-46 (1996) (supporting
the signaling role of marriage from an efficiency perspective).
136. See Elizabeth S. Scott & Robert E. Scott, A Contract Theory of Marriage, in THE
FALL AND RISE OF FREEDOM OF CONTRACT, supra note 135, at 201,216 ("The signaling function
of marriage (as distinct from a cohabitation agreement) serves to reveal a person's preferences
toward sexual and social relationships in which he or she may wish to become involved."
(citations omitted)).
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The signaling aspect of marriage corresponds to updated efficiency
analysis in another respect. An emerging branch in law and economic
scholarship regarding the efficient default rules rejects the majority rule and
prefers default rules that create incentives for information delivery between the
partners 137 by forcing one of them to contract out from the default rule and
reveal her future expectations. 38 Apparently, conventional application of this
approach results in the equation of marriage and cohabitation in a way that
would force the financially stronger party to opt out and expose her intention
not to share. 139 This application, however, ignores the tendency of prospective
couples in general and prospective cohabitants in particular, not to contract. 140
Thus, from a contractual perspective, the couple might stick to a default rule
that does not reflect the couple's intentions, while still not receiving the benefit
of information delivery. It is precisely at this point that the benefit of the
signaling mechanism, which the pluralist distinction between marriage and
cohabitation offers, becomes clear. Instead of offering one default rule and
unrealistically expecting one of the partners to contract out, the pluralist
approach offers a unique bipolar default system (that is, marriage law and
cohabitation law).' 4' Hence, it allows one partner to signal to the other
important information regarding her intentions and expectations without the
need to contract in or out, as conventional signal default rule models
unrealistically expect.142
137. See, e.g., Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: An
Economic Theory of Default Rules, 99 YALE L.J. 87, 97-100 (1989) (suggesting a "penalty
default rule" that focuses on information delivery between the couples).
138. See, e.g., Lucian Ayre Bebchuk & Steven Shavell, Information and the Scope of
Liability for Breach of Contract: The Rule oflHadley v. Baxendale, 7 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 284,
289-90 (1991) (asserting that the limited liability rule of Hadley encourages high valuation
buyers to communicate). But cf Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Strategic ContractualInefficiency
and the Optimal Choice ofLegal Rules, 101 YALE L.J. 729, 738-41 (1992) (exposing situations
in which the penalty default rule fails to incentivize information delivery).
139. See Scott, supra note 19, at 342-45 (supporting equation of long-term cohabitation
and marriage from penalty default law perspective).
140. See Brinig, supra note 43, at 271-73 (rejecting the penalty default law justification for
the equation of marriage and cohabitation based on empirical findings regarding couples'
reluctance to contract).
141. While extensive research exists regarding the default rule, law and economic
scholarship recently revealed the importance of a menu. See Ian Ayres, Menus Matter, 73 U.
Cmi. L. REv. 3, 3 (2006) ("A menu is a contractual offer that empowers the offeree to accept
more than one type of contract."); Yair Listokin, What Do Corporate Default Rules andMenus
Do? An Empirical Examination (Yale Law School Research Paper No. 335), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=924578 (demonstrating the importance of offering a menu of default
laws in corporate law).
142. Apparently, one should argue that the need to get married according to the pluralist
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B. Designing Cohabitation as an Autonomy-Based Social Institution
A philosophical debate exists regarding the morality of pluralism.
43
According to one view, pluralism justifies a passive role of the state and
tolerance toward non-liberal practices that harm the individual within groups.44
This Article's pluralist theory, however, is part of a liberal tradition that bases
pluralism on the liberal value of autonomy. 145 While demanding that the liberal
state support and encourage a range of social institutions, it also insists that
those institutions should not harm the autonomy of their members.'46 The
concept of autonomy providing the foundation for the pluralist theory not only
justifies the state's involvement in designing cohabitation as a separate social
institution, but also lays down the cornerstone for such an institution.
Designing cohabitation as an autonomy-based social institution prescribes three
major principles: (1) substantive freedom of choice; (2) tolerance for couples'
lifestyles, limited by state responsibility for preventing exploitation; and
(3) restricted individualism, emphasizing the right of exit, yet respectful of
relational commitments. A careful application of these principles enables the
pluralist approach to integrate the arguments of the equating models into its
normative framework without neglecting the basic arguments in favor of the
distinction between marriage and cohabitation.
model is parallel to the conventional need to opt out by agreement in a signal default law
system. Yet, the bipolar system has two main advantages over signal default law. First, by
designing the social content of both institutions (marriage and cohabitation), the transaction cost
of private contracting is saved. See Listokin, supra note 141, at 41 ("Transaction costs are
reduced even when the corporate enabling laws are offered as menus rather than instituted as
default laws."). Second, while private contracting is often perceived by parties as contradictory
of the romantic vision and intimacy of a spousal relationship, the historical and cultural
background of marriage have the opposite influence, namely that the request for marriage
usually enhances intimacy and the romantic aspects of spousal lives.
143. See JOHN KEKES, THE MORALITY OF PLURALSM 15-37 (1993) (comparing six theses of
pluralism).
144. See, e.g., Chandran Kukathas, Liberalism and Multiculturalism: The Politics of
Indifference, 26 POL. THEORY 686, 687 (1998) (suggesting a pluralist justification for
multiculturalism).
145. See supra notes 132-33 (describing the approaches of Raz, Kymlicka, and
Gardbaum); see also ISAIAH BERLIN, FouR ESSAYS ON LIBERTY 118-72 (1969) (discussing the
early roots of the liberal-pluralist approach).
146. See RAZ, supra note 12, at 155, 160-63 (discussing the way multiculturalism gives
shape to individual freedom).
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1. Substantive Freedom of Choice
The pluralist approach is based first and foremost on strengthening
individual autonomy by offering a multitude of different options.147 Yet, the
existence of a variety of options is meaningless if the individual is unable to
choose between them. The pluralist approach, thus, accepts the same-sex
argument that the liberal case for distinguishing marriage and cohabitation is
not valid for those who are disqualified to get married. Consequently, it
suggests a unique legal regime for same-sex cohabitants. More importantly, it
demonstrates that from a pluralist perspective, cohabitation is an insufficient
substitute for same-sex couples. Hence, it argues for the necessity of same-sex
marriage or as a second best, the establishment of spousal institutions like civil
unions.148
Similarly, but in a different context, unlike the formal egalitarianism that
characterizes the explicit contract model, the pluralist model's emphasis on
autonomy ensures that living as cohabitants reflects substantive free choice on
the part of both partners, and not the result of a unilateral decision of the more
powerful partner. Thus, when the powerful partner takes advantage of the
weaker partner's vulnerable situation and deprives her of the ability to make a
meaningful choice, the pluralist theory supports the imposition of marriage
commitments on cohabitants even against their formal or informal
agreements. 1
49
2. Tolerance, State Responsibility, and the Extra-Contractual
Considerations
The second principle addresses the tension between a couple's autonomy
to manage their own lives and the state's responsibility to prevent unfairness
and exploitation. Traditionally, legal regulation of marriage expressed and
supported shared moral principles and interests of society as a whole,
sometimes even at the cost of limiting the couple's freedoms. 150 During the
147. See id. at 373 ("For a person to enjoy an autonomous life he must actually use these
faculties to choose what life to have. There must in other words be adequate options available
for him to choose from.").
148. See infra Part V.A (discussing same-sex marriage and civil unions from a pluralist
perspective).
149. See infra Part IV.F (suggesting mechanisms for distinguishing between different types
of decision-making).
150. See, e.g., Mary Ann Glendon, Marriage and the State: The Withering Away of
Marriage, 62 VA. L. REv. 663, 711-20 (1976) (describing the public nature of traditional
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second half of the twentieth century, however, a private ideology of family
emerged that emphasized the couple's freedom over society's moral values and
general interests.' 5' Yet even today, marriage regulation reflects complex
compromises and balancing acts between society's interest, 5 2 ethos regarding
proper spousal relationships,' 53 and couples' autonomy to choose their own
lifestyle. According to the pluralist approach, at this point, marriage and
divorce should diverge, and cohabitation law should give more respect than
marriage law to the partners' lifestyle and abstain from supporting any specific
public agenda.
Apparently, the emphasis of the pluralist approach on the couples'
autonomy moves it closer to the contractual approach and exposes it to the
extra-contractual argument. Closer inspection, however, reveals that unlike the
passive-negative liberal approach that characterizes the contractual models, the
pluralist approach has the potential to take the extra-contractual argument into
consideration. The pluralist theory emphasizes the active role of the state in
encouraging diversity by creating a variety of spousal institutions. 154 This
active role puts on the state the responsibility for those institutions (marriage
and cohabitation). It is sensitive to situations in which cohabitation without
legal rights is a source or a by-product of exploitation and subordination and
thus undermines the autonomy basis of the pluralist theory. 55 The pluralist
theory, therefore, challenges lawmakers not only to reflect on and support the
regulation of marriage and divorce); Carl E. Schneider, Moral Discourse and the
Transformation ofAmerican Family Law, 83 MICH. L. REv. 1803, 1805-13 (1985) (describing
the traditional moral discourse of American family law).
151. See Singer, supra note 41, at 1446-69 (describing privatization of American family
law); see also Valerio Pocar & Paola Ronfani, From Institution to Self-Regulation, in THE
EUROPEAN FAMILY: THE FAMILY QUESTION IN THE EUROPEAN COMMUNrrY 195, 196 (Jacques
Commaille & Francois de Singly eds., 1997) (locating the privation movement within a broader
Western process).
152. See Karen Servidea, Note, Reviewing Premarital Agreements to Protect the State's
Interest in Marriage, 91 VA. L. REv. 535, 554-65 (2005) (suggesting a public approach to
premarital agreements).
153. See, e.g., Naomi R. Cahn, The Moral Complexities of Family Law, 50 STAN. L. REv.
225, 245-48 (1998) (review essay) (identifying new moral discourse that dominates modem
family law); see also Frantz & Dagan, supra note 27, at 98-106 (arguing that marital property
law should be perceived as an expression of a societal ideal for marriage as an egalitarian
community).
154. See e.g., KEKEs, supra note 143, at 215 ("If a state were indeed committed to
pluralism, it would have to support all these institutions, and others too of course, and by
supporting them, it would have to take an active role in advocating very many substantive
values.").
155. See RA, supra note 132, at 390-99 (discussing the value of autonomy under a theory
of pluralism).
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diversity of spousal institutions but also to supervise the content of each of
those institutions.
Consequently, the pluralist approach opposes the full equation of marriage
and cohabitation. Specifically, it opposes the imposition of legal rules that aim
to direct couples to behave in accordance with society's vision regarding
marriage. At the same time, the sensitivity of the pluralist approach to extra-
contractual considerations guides the pluralist model to apply those elements of
marriage law that aim to prevent weaker cohabitating partners from exploitation
and unfair treatment.
3. Individualism, Right of Exit, and Relational Commitments
The third component of the design of cohabitation as an autonomy-based
institution is individualism and the right of exit. Historically, marriage law
focused on the family as community and usually preferred the community to the
individual members of the family.5 6 The thorough restrictions of divorce law
on the ability to end the relationship-as well as alimony, which continues the
relationship of divorced couples-demonstrate that perception of unity. During
the second half of the twentieth century, in parallel to privatization, a process of
individualization emerged in Western family law, which emphasized the
individual identity of family members.'57  One central ingredient of
individualization is the recognition in modem marriage law of the partner's
right of exit,158 which is expressed by the shift from fault divorce to unilateral
no-fault divorce 59 and the rise of the "clean break" as a guiding principle of
modem alimony law. 160  Still, despite the rise of the individualization
156. See Bruce C. Hafen, The Family as an Entity, 22 U.C. DAvIs L. REv. 865,874 (1989)
("[N]ineteenth century jurisprudence developed a rationale for society's interest.., in stable
marriage and the nurturing of children. The family was seen as a crucial social institution,
which gave society an interest in the rearing and education of 'sound and well-bred citizens for
the future."').
157. Cf. GLENDON, supra note 40, at 102 ("In summary, then, we have noted the emergence
of new legal images of the family which, in varying degrees, stress the separate personalities of
the family members rather than the unitary aspect of the family."); see also Elizabeth S. Scott,
Rehabilitating Liberalism in Modern Divorce Law, 1994 UTAH L. REv. 687, 687 ("[T]he law
increasingly has come to deal with the family not as an organic unit bound by ties of
relationship, but as a loose association of separate individuals.").
158. See Frantz& Dagan, supra note 27, at 85-87 (describing the need for a partner's right
of free exit under a liberal value system).
159. See GLENDON, supra note 40, at 148-90 (discussing the historical development of
divorce reform laws in Europe and the United States).
160. See, e.g., Koelsch v. Koelsch, 713 P.2d 1234, 1241-43 (Ariz. 1986) (emphasizing the
importance of a clean break in determining the method of property distribution).
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principles, important aspects of marriage law still prefer the "We" over the 1,"
or at least try to balance the individual autonomy of each spouse with the
community aspect of the marital unit. 161 Furthermore, in recent years, there has
been a trend to restore alimony and other forms of post-divorce spousal
commitment in a way that undermines the clean-break principle. 162 In some
legal regimes, even the move toward unilateral no-fault divorce itself is under
attack. 63  All these indications reinforce the prevalence of unity and
community over individualization in marriage law.
In contrast to the complex relationship between community and
individualization in the case of marriage, 64 cohabitation as an autonomy-based
institution should adhere to the individualistic approach that emphasizes the
separateness of the cohabitants. The individualistic aspects of cohabitation law
become extremely important regarding the ending of the relationship. 165 Thus,
while marriage law imposes, in certain circumstances, long-term post-divorce
spousal commitment, 166 the pluralist model insists on the right of each
cohabitant to end the relationship easily and to untie the economic connections
between the spouses a short time after their separation.
The value of autonomy supports not only the right of each partner to end
the relationship, but also her ability to make binding legal commitments.
67
This aspect of autonomy challenges the pluralist theory's attempt to balance the
ex ante and ex post perspectives.
From an ex ante channeling perspective-focusing on distinguishing
marriage and cohabitation-the pluralist theory prefers that couples take upon
161. See June Carbone, Income Sharing: Redefining the Family in Terms of Community,
31 Hous. L. REv. 359, 413-14 (1994) (offering a community theory of marital property law); cf.
Frantz & Dagan, supra note 27, at 133 (offering a theory of marital property law based on
autonomy, community, and equality).
162. For a discussion of the trends in property relationships between cohabitants, see infra
Part IV.C.
163. For a discussion on the criticisms of no-fault divorce, see infra Part V.C.
164. Compare Frantz & Dagan, supra note 27, at 76-81 (offering a theory of marital
property law based on autonomy, community, and equality), with RAZ,supra note 132, at 369-
429 (designing a modem liberal theory based on the principles of freedom and individual
autonomy).
165. See, for example, infra Part IV.C.3 for a discussion of how the pluralist model
accounts for the individualist aspects of cohabitation law in the distribution of property.
166. See, e.g., Ira M. Ellman, The Theory of Alimony, 77 CAL. L. REv. 1, 4-10 (1989)
(discussing the purpose for and historical trends of alimony as a post-divorce spousal
commitment).
167. See Seana Valentine Shiffrin, Promising, Intimate Relationships, and
Conventionalism, 117 PHIL. REv. 481, 519-20 (2008) (suggesting an autonomy-based account
of contractual commitments).
1600
MARRIED AGAINST THEIR WILL?
themselves legal commitments either by marriage or by expressed contracts.68
From an ex post perspective, the autonomy rationale entails a dynamic aspect
that enables the spouses to update their life plan and take upon themselves
relational commitments.169 Rigid adherence to the historical decision of
cohabitants not to get married-even if their behavior and lifestyle (albeit not
their contract) reflect deviation from their original choices--does not
correspond to the dynamic aspect of autonomy.
As the next part shows, the pluralist model balances between the ex ante
and the ex post perspective in the following way. On the one hand, like the
relational contract model, the pluralist model recognizes the relational
commitments between couples, even if those commitments were not expressed
in legal terms. 70  On the other hand, there are two important differences
between the pluralist and existing relational theory. First, while the existing
version of the relational theory implicitly identifies the relational commitment
between cohabitants with marriage commitments,' 71 the pluralist model
distinguishes between marriage commitments and the relational spousal
commitments embedded in cohabitation. Second, the existing relational theory
establishes simple criteria involving a period of joint dwelling that define
cohabitants, and then presumes that all cohabitants share the same relational
commitments. 172 In contrast, the pluralist approach maintains that substantive
fulfillment of the relational contract ideology should result in a fine-tuning
mechanism that adjusts the content of the relational contract to different types
of cohabitant lifestyles.
IV. From Theory to Practice: The Pluralist Model of Cohabitant Law
A. Outline of a Model
According to the pluralist approach, marriage and cohabitation should be
separate legal institutions. Thus, the pluralist approach rejects the status model
168. See supra Part III.A. 1 for an account of the ex ante channeling perspective and its
influences on the pluralist model.
169. See supra Part III.A.2 for an account of the autonomy-based rationale for pluralism.
170. See Macneil, supra note 62, at 773 ("When such tacit assumptions concern an
exchange, and when they are mutual assumptions, they serve the same planning functions as
specifically expressed mutual consent.").
171. See supra notes 64-66 and accompanying text (discussing the identifiers of relational
commitment under the relational theory).
172. See Scott, supra note 3, at 258-61 (suggesting the law should presume an implied
contract to apply marriage law in any case of cohabitation spanning over five years).
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with its complete merger of marriage and cohabitation commitments. 17 3 At the
same time, the pluralist theory also rejects the opposite policy that denies any
commitments between cohabitants. Instead of these all-or-nothing approaches,
the pluralist approach suggests a careful design of cohabitation as a separate
social and legal institution with rights and duties that draw on the philosophical
foundations that justify its separate existence. Hence, the pluralist model offers
a selective application of elements of marriage law to cohabitants. The model
further suggests three criteria to determine the appropriate components of
marriage law to apply to cohabitation.
The first criterion distinguishes between the channeling and responsive
components of marriage law. 174 This distinction balances the ex ante aspiration
to design marriage and cohabitation as separate social institutions and the ex
post response for situations in which, during a cohabitation period, cohabitants'
lifestyle and needs resemble those of married partners. According to the
pluralist model, thus, those components of marriage law with the principal
function of encouraging specific kinds of behaviors or to express society's
ethos regarding marriage properties should not apply to cohabitation. In
contrast, "responsive" provisions of marriage law, such as provisions focusing
on the protection of weaker and dependant family members, should be applied
to cohabitants.
175
Second, based on the original rationale of marriage law, the pluralist
model distinguishes between those components of a contractual nature and
those that are extra-contractual. 176 In those cases in which marriage law itself
is based mainly on the expressed---or presumed-intentions of the parties, it
might not be appropriate to impose marriage law on those who have chosen not
to get married. In contrast, in those cases in which marriage law is based on
extra-contractual considerations, such as justice, prevention of exploitation, or
protection of children, it would be appropriate to impose it on cohabitants.
The third criterion distinguishes between community- and autonomy-based
components of marriage law. 177 It suggests that cohabitation law should
173. Cf Lewis, supra note 35, at 82-90 (noting that the legal means for discouraging
cohabitation included excluding cohabitants from marriage rights, defining children born
outside of marriage as illegitimate, and, in some states, even criminalizing cohabitation).
174. See Atiyah, supra note 25, at 1251-70 (distinguishing between the directive-
channeling function of the law and its responsive-reflective aspects).
175. For a discussion of responsive provisions of marriage law, see supra Part I.
176. For a discussion of the contractual approach to marriage law, see supra Part ll.B. For
a discussion of the extra-contractual approach, see supra Part II.D. 1.
177. See Frantz & Dagan, supra note 27, at 76-81 (offering a theory of marital property
law based on autonomy, community, and equality).
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recognize the commitments between the partners as individuals. In contrast,
cohabitation law should reject regulation that prefers the "We" aspects of
spousal relationships over the "I," and should reject limitations on the spouses'
right of exit.
An additional unique feature of the pluralist theory is its sensitivity to the
variety of cohabitant relationships. Contrary to the current legal approaches,
the pluralist model distinguishes between trial marriage, regular cohabitants,
relational cohabitants, same-sex cohabitants, and exploitation cohabitation. It
tailors a unique package of rights and duties to each kind of cohabitation.
First, the model posits an "entry requirement." This requirement is
designed to screen couples that are trying out their relationship. According to
the model, trial periods should not be regulated by cohabitation law, but rather
by regular civil doctrines such as theories of contract law and unjust
enrichment.
178
Second, the pluralist model defines significant cohabitation periods,
accompanied by relational commitments179 between the partners, as relational
cohabitations. It offers an innovative distinction between regular and relational
cohabitants. Couples in the former category are entitled to the basic package of
cohabitation law that includes mainly the responsive, extra-contractual, and
autonomy-based components of marriage law.180 Those in the latter category
are entitled to an extended package that reflects their relational commitments,
closer, albeit not identical, to marriage law.
Third, the model discusses the validity of different kinds of agreements
between cohabitants. It distinguishes between exploitive situations and
egalitarian decision-making between cohabitants. 81 In egalitarian situations,
the model respects the cohabitants' formal agreement, and, in some
circumstances, even acknowledges informal understandings that deviate from
the conventional cohabitant law. 82 In situations that raise suspicion of
exploitation, the model demands formal agreements in order to opt out of
178. See supra notes 86-89 and accompanying text (discussing the application of regular
civil doctrines to cohabitation).
179. For the difference between implied and expressed relational commitments, see supra
Part II.C. For the classification criteria of regular and relational cohabitants, see infra Part IV.E.
180. For a discussion of responsive provisions of marriage law, see supra Part I. See supra
Part II.D. 1 for a discussion of the extra-contractual components of marriage law. See supra Part
III.A.2 for an account of the autonomy-based components of marriage law.
181. See infra Part IV.F for a discussion of how the pluralist model distinguishes between
exploitive and egalitarian decision-making.
182. See infra Part IV.F for examples of egalitarian-neutral situations.
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cohabitant obligations, and even those formal agreements are subject to strict
supervision.
83
Finally, the model distinguishes between same-sex and different-sex
couples and argues that in certain circumstances, same-sex cohabitants'
commitments should be parallel to marriage law. The following Parts elaborate
on the implications of the new model.
B. Who Should Be Defined as Cohabitants?
Sociologists tend to view a short period of cohabitation as a trial period,
following which the parties are likely to determine whether or not they wish to
make a more serious commitment.184 The pluralist theory supports this trial
period function because it empowers the autonomy of the couple, improves
spousal choosing mechanisms, and deepens the meaning of marriage as a signal
for commitment. Moreover, in cases of short, childless relationships, the extra-
contractual justifications for imposing a marriage commitment on cohabitants
are relatively weak. For these reasons, the pluralist model requires that a
couple live together for a substantive minimum period of time before they may
acquire cohabitation rights. Partners' inter-claims within this trial period
should be regulated according to regular civil law doctrines.'
85
The model distinguishes, however, between childless cohabitation and
cohabitation that is accompanied by common children. First, from the
screening and signaling perspectives, joint upbringing of children might reflect
higher commitment than regular cohabitation. 86 Second, when children are
183. See infra Part IV.F for examples of situations that raise suspicions of exploitation.
184. See, e.g., Thomas J. Abernathy, Adolescent Cohabitation: A Form of Courtship or
Marriage?, 16 ADOLESCENCE 791, 791 (1981) ("[C]ohabitation has been described variously as
another aspect of courtship; and extension of the engagement period; and a trial, or two-stage
marriage." (citations omitted)); Alfred DeMaris & William MacDonald, Premarital
Cohabitation and Marital Instability: A Test of the Unconventionality Hypothesis, 55 J.
MARRIAGE & FAM. 399, 399 (1993) (discussing cohabitation as a testing ground for marital
incompatibility); Alfred DeMaris & K. Vaninadha Rao, Premarital Cohabitation and
Subsequent Marital Instability in the United States: A Reassessment, 54 J. MARRIAGE & FAM.
178, 178 (1992) (assessing the validity of the claim that premarital cohabitation serves to filter
incompatible partners).
185. Treatment of commitments between parties during the trial period should resemble
treatment of precontractual liability commitment. For a discussion of the implications of
precontractual liability in contract law, see generally Alan Schwartz & Robert E. Scott,
Precontractual Liability and Preliminary Agreements, 120 HARV. L. REv. 661 (2007); Lucian
Arye Bebchuk & Omri Ben-Shahar, Precontractual Reliance, 30 J. LEGAL STUD. 423 (2001).
186. For a discussion of the channeling perspective as an ex ante screening mechanism, see
supra Part III.A. 1. For a discussion of the signaling function of marriage, see supra Part
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involved, the extra-contractual rationales are more compelling, and, according
to the model, would justify imposing selective components of marriage law on
cohabitants. 87 The accurate minimal duration of the trial period might be
influenced by specific demographic and sociological variables in a specific
society. Yet as a rule of thumb, a three-year minimum for childless
cohabitation and a one-year minimum for cohabitants with children sound
plausible.
1 88
Apparently, simplicity and predictability considerations might support a
mechanical test period ofjoint habitation as a sole entry requirement.18 9 But if
simplicity, predictability, and ex ante planning considerations totally overcome
ex post sensitivity to diversity in actual lifestyle, then the formal explicit
contract model is the preferable model. The pluralist model, thus, prefers in
this context a more nuanced approach that posits living together as a rebuttable
presumption that can be refuted by a demonstration that the supposed
cohabitants did not share a life together as a couple. 90
ALl, for example, established thirteen factors to assist courts in deciding
whether a couple shared a life together.' 9' Some factors, such as making
statements regarding the relationship or participation in commitment
III.A.3.
187. For a discussion of extra-contractual rationales, see supra Part III.B.2.
188. The ALI suggests a three-year minimum for childless cohabitation and a two-year
minimum for cohabitants with children. See ALl, supra note 6, at 921 ("If ajurisdiction sets the
Paragraph (3) cohabitation period at three years, a reasonable choice, a Paragraph (2)
cohabitation parenting period of two years would be appropriate."). New Zealand provides for
a three-year minimum cohabitation period, but it grants the court discretion to reduce this period
when children are involved and serious injustice may occur. See Property (Relationships) Act
1976, 2001 S.N.Z. No. 166, § 14A (permitting the New Zealand courts to reduce the minimum
cohabitation period under certain circumstances). Compare, though, the case-by-case approach
of the implied contract theory that does not state any minimum durational threshold. Supra Part
II.C. 1; see also Lifshitz, supra note 72, at 374 (describing the recognition of an extremely short
cohabitation period in Israel). However, the pluralist theory also opposes the five-year
minimum cohabitation period that Scott suggests because it leaves the weaker party without
sufficient remedies for an extended period. See Scott, supra note 19, at 343 ("A cohabitational
period of at least five years, for example, supports a presumption that the relationship was
marriage-like and also discourages opportunistic and marginal claims.").
189. See Scott, supra note 19, at 342-43 (suggesting a five-year minimum cohabitation as a
simple framework that promotes certainty for both the courts and the parties).
190. See also Bill Atkin, The Legal World of Unmarried Couples: Reflections on "De
Facto Relationships" in Recent New Zealand Legislation, 39 VUW L. REV. 793, 796-810
(2008) (describing a similar mechanism in New Zealand).
191. See, e.g., ALI, supra note 6, § 6.03 (establishing thirteen factors to determine whether
a two persons share a life together as a couple); see also Property (Relationships) Act 1976,
2001 S.N.Z. No. 166, § 2D(2) (stating ten factors regarding the partners' lifestyle to guide the
court in determining whether they should be considered as a couple).
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ceremonies, are more contractual. Other objective factors, such as
intermingling finances, becoming economically dependent, having defined
tasks, dividing roles between partners, and raising children jointly, are more
extra-contractually oriented.1
92
Most of the ALI factors might also serve the pluralist model in the
screening process. Yet, there is a substantive difference between the status
approaches of ALI and the pluralist model's mechanism. According to the ALI
method, after considering its presumptions and guiding factors, the court should
give a definite answer as to whether the partners are actually domestic partners
(the ALl label for cohabitants). 193 In the case of an affirmative answer,
cohabitation law (which, according to ALl, is almost identical to marriage law)
should be applied. 94 The pluralist model, on the other hand, argues that the
entry requirements should not be applied uniformly, but rather should be
adapted to the specific types of cohabitants' rights.
Thus, for regular cohabitants, legal rights are based mainly on extra-
contractual considerations; the entry requirements to getting those rights should
be based mainly on objective factors, such as economic dependency, mutual
contribution, and specification of roles. In contrast, the "relational package" is
based on a relational contract theory that is sensitive to the parties' consent
commitments. 95 Thus, the requirements for getting these rights should give
substantial room to consensual factors like mutual statements, ceremonies, and
the like.
Even beyond the general classification as regular or relational cohabitants,
the pluralist model matches the entry requirements criteria to the specific
cohabitant rights. For example, if a partner sues for alimony, then the decision
whether she is a cohabitant will be based on the economic dependency of the
other partner. On the other hand, if a partner sues for marital property, then the
mutual contribution, including contribution from domestic tasks, will be the
important criterion.
Given this definition of cohabitants, we move now to the scope of their
mutual duties. Subparts C and D address regular cohabitants, focusing on
192. Cf Martha M. Ertman, Private Ordering Under the ALl Principles: As Natural
Status, in RECONCEIVING THiE FAMILY, supra note 19, at 284, 284 (suggesting a classification
similar to the ALI factors).
193. See ALI, supra note 6, at 916-18 (outlining the factors a court must consider when
making the determination that two persons are domestic partners).
194. See id at 938 ("This section incorporates by reference... the classification rules for
property owned by married persons at dissolution.").
195. For a detailed discussion of the "relational package" under the pluralist model, see
infra Part IV.E.
1606
MARRIED AGAINST THEIR WILL?
marital property, alimony, and compensation for career loss, which are the main
components of the economic relationship between spouses. Subpart E defines
relational cohabitants and discusses their extended duties.
C. Property Relationship Between Cohabitants
1. The Equal Division Rule and Its Underlying Rationales
In order to examine which part of the current marital property regime
should be applied to regular cohabitants, let us start with a brief introduction to
marital property law and its underlying rationales.
The cornerstone of the contemporary marital property law' 96 is the rule of
equal division of marital property upon divorce (the equal division rule).
197
Two main rationales were given for this rule. The first rationale is based on the
joint contribution of the couple backed by analogy to commercial partnership.
The second rationale addresses the ideal of marriage as an egalitarian
community.
The contribution rationale addresses the contemporary task division
among couples wherein the provider-generally the man-contributes to the
family's welfare by working outside the home and the other partner (generally
the woman) is responsible for care of the home, while giving up, either partially
or fully, on a career.198 While the latter's efforts allow the former to earn
income and accumulate property, formal property law ignores such
contribution, and, hence, results in injustice.' 99
196. Historically, the regulation of the property relation between couples was divided
between community property states (in which property acquired from labor during marriage was
considered to be community property) and common law states (in which the property of each
member of a couple was considered to be separate or private). In the recent decades, however,
the gap between the states narrowed as even common law states began to divide property
acquired during the marriage upon the marriage's dissolution. For early descriptions of those
movements, see Susan Westerberg Prager, Sharing Principles and the Future of Marital Law,
25 UCLA L. REv. 1, 14-23 (1977).
197. See Frantz & Dagan, supra note 27, at 100 ("The cornerstone of the contemporary law
of marital property-the one rule that seems least disputed (at least as a theoretical matter) by
courts, commentators, and lay people alike-is the rule of equal division upon divorce."). It
might be admitted, though, that even today there are gaps between different states. For a survey
of state laws regarding the division of property upon divorce, see id. at 100-02 nn.107-15;
OLDHAM, supra note 28, § 3.03.
198. See Motro, supra note 29, at 1633 ("Non- or low-wage-earning spouses often
contribute substantially to their partners' earnings-both directly... and indirectly, by
managing the household and raising children.").
199. See, e.g., Martha Albertson Fineman, Our SacredInstitution: The Ideal ofthe Family
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Theoretically, the contribution rationale might support an equitable regime
that authorizes courts to measure the relative contribution of the spouses to the
acquisition of income and property. °° It has been argued, however, that in the
absence of a market value for the domestic role,20' the equal division rule is
preferable to equitable division because it prevents an arbitrary result2 2 -or
even worse, equitable division may systematically underestimate the domestic
partner's contribution.20 3 Finally, an analogy has been drawn between
marriage's economic arrangement and commercial partnerships. Some have
argued that, as in a commercial partnership, equal division should be the default
rule in marriage as well.2°
The contribution theory is highly influential, 20 5 but it is not very
convincing, since it is unlikely true that in all cases the non-market domestic
in American Law and Society, 1993 UTAH L. REv. 387, 397 ("[I]t is the contribution they have
made to the family that justifies their partnership share at dissolution."); see also Katherine
Silbaugh, Commodification and Women's Household Labor, 9 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 81, 109-
10 (1997) (noting that the idea of equal exchange requires that we focus on the non-monetary
contributions of women to compensate for their market disadvantage); Shahar Lifshitz, On Past
Property and Future Property, and on the Philosophy of Marital Property Law in Israeli Law,
34 HEBREW U. STUDENT L.J. 627 (2004) (analyzing the injustice in a separate property system
that ignores the domestic spouse's contribution).
200. Lifshitz, supra note 199, at 630-31; see also Sanford N. Katz, Marriage as
Partnership, 73 NoTRE DAME L. REv. 1251, 1272 (1998) (suggesting arguments in favor of
including relative contribution as a factor in equitable distribution decisions).
201. In theory, domestic tasks like cleaning, cooking, and childcare are executed by
outsiders and have clear market value. I believe, however, that at least in the case of child
rearing, a parent's care cannot be equated with paid labor. Additionally, even today, only some
parenting tasks, such as actual care of the children during working hours, have been
commoditized, but other parenting tasks like parental responsibility, management of child and
house issues, and supervision of outside workers within the home, are not commercial and lack
a clear market value.
202. See, e.g., J. Thomas Oldham, Tracing, Commingling, and Transmutation, 23 FAM.
L.Q. 219, 249-50 (1989) (describing drawbacks of broad judicial discretion over divorce);
David Westfall, Unprincipled Family Dissolution: The American Law Institute's
Recommendations for Spousal Support and Division of Property, 27 HARv. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y
917, 920-21 (2004) (criticizing the unpredictability of a case-by-case equitability system).
203. See Motro, supra note 29, at 1633-34 ("[A]d hoc valuations of spouses' relative
contributions.. . often mirror society's tendency to undervalue nonmarket labor."); see also
Jana B. Singer, Divorce Reform and Gender Justice, 67 N.C. L. REv. 1103, 1119 (1989)
("[D]ivorce doctrines that allow for substantial judicial discretion generally operate to women's
disadvantage.').
204. See Lawrence W. Waggoner, Marital Property Rights in Transition, 59 Mo. L. REv.
21,43-44 (1994) (describing the partnership theory of marriage by analogizing to commercial
partnerships).
205. See Motro, supra note 29, at 1631 ("The most prevalent justification for the rule
classifying spouses' earnings as marital is known variously as the partnership theory of
marriage, the contribution theory, the joint property theory, or the marital-sharing theory."
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partner's contribution equals the income of the "provider."206 This critique of
the contribution theory is especially valid in cases of healthy, childless couples
that out-source most of their domestic tasks.2 °7 It is also useful in situations of
high-income providers, whose earning power is based on a unique skill or
reputation acquired prior to the marriage, or where there are providers taking
the primary responsibility for the domestic tasks. Beyond those situations,
there is a deeper problem with the contribution rationale and the analogy
between marriage and commercial relationships. In the commercial context,
the separate individualistic identities of the partners are usually maintained. In
the family context-specifically in cases of long-term relationships-"spouses
perceive themselves at least partially as a 'we'-a plural subject that is in turn a
constitutive feature of each spouse's identity., 20 8 This "we" perception recently
led Professors Dagan and Frantz to suggest the ideal of marriage as an
egalitarian community.2°9 According to Dagan and Frantz, at least in normative
families, spouses usually develop an egalitarian community during marriage
that enables them to share life's advantages as well as its difficulties.210 Marital
property law should reflect and encourage such an ethos regarding marriage by
adopting the equal division rule, regardless of the partners' actual contributions.
2. The Applicability of the Equal Division Rule's Rationales to
Cohabitation
According to the pluralist model, while the egalitarian community ideal is
the proper rationale for marital property in the case of married spouses, it is not
(citations omitted)).
206. Cf Frantz & Dagan, supra note 27, at 102 ("[T]here is little reason to believe that the
non-market contributions of the spouse with less market power are sufficient to balance the
other spouse's significant market power advantage."); see also ALI, supra note 6, at 735 ("[I]t is
precisely because spouses are not usually financial equals that the rules governing the financial
consequences of divorce have such importance.").
207. See, e.g., Motro, supra note 29, at 1640 ("The equal division rule is especially unfair
from a labor-centered perspective where both spouses earn significantly different amounts and
there are no children.").
208. Frantz & Dagan, supra note 27, at 81-82; see also Milton C. Regan, Spousal
Privilege and the Meaning of Marriage, 81 VA. L. REv. 2045, 2079-89 (1995) (describing the
family as a larger relational unit).
209. See Frantz & Dagan, supra note 27, at 100-02 (justifying the equal division law as an
endorsement of egalitarian liberal community); see also Lifshitz, supra note 199, at 676-77
(describing the family as a unit as the rationale of recent developments in Israeli marital
property law).
210. See Frantz & Dagan, supra note 27, at 104 ("Spreading the benefits and risks of this
kind of behavior equally between the parties transforms personal sacrifice into joint endeavor.").
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applicable to cohabitants. First, the egalitarian community ideal is a channeling
rationale that seeks to design marriage in an ideal way.21' Since the pluralist
approach aspires to distinguish the social institution of cohabitation from that of
marriage, it should abstain from automatically applying the marriage ideal to
cohabitation. Furthermore, substantively, the ideal of marriage-the
commitment that makes two "Is" into a "We"--does not suit the autonomy-
based building of the cohabitation institution.
In contrast, the contribution theory-in spite of, and, perhaps because of,
its limited scope regarding marriage-is, I believe, the proper model for
cohabitation property law. First, the contribution rationale is a classical
"responsive" rationale, rather than a rationale that intends to design marriage in
specific ways.212 The pluralist approach is open to imposing rules built on
responsive rationales to cohabitants. Second, the contribution rational and the
analogy to commercial relationships are based on an individualistic model that
suits the pluralist construction of cohabitation law.213 Finally, the contribution
rational is a perfect example of the extra-contractual consideration. As such,
the pluralist approach supports its imposition on cohabitants.
3. Cohabitation Property Law
Basing cohabitation property law on the contribution ideal rather than on
the egalitarian-community ideal creates some specific and quite dramatic
implications for the flexibility and scope of the equal division rule between
marriage and cohabitation.
a. Deviations from the Equal Division Rule in Case of
Asymmetric Contribution
The egalitarian community rationale perceives equal division as
intrinsically valuable and as an expression of societal vision about proper
marital relationship.214 Thus, it applies the equal division rule regardless of the
spouses' actual contribution, even in cases in which there are clear gaps in the
211. See id. at 98-106 (arguing that marital property law should be perceived as an
expression of a societal ideal for marriage as an egalitarian community).
212. For a further discussion of the contribution rationale, see supra Part IV.C.1.
213. See supra note 204 and accompanying text (drawing an analogy between marriage's
economic arrangements and commercial partnerships).
214. See Frantz & Dagan, supra note 27, at 103-06 (arguing that the equal division rule
encourages partners to view their marriage communally and promotes a sense of equality).
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contributions of each partner to the acquisitions of the family assets. In the case
of cohabitants, however, the contribution theory is the sole justification for the
equal division rule. Thus, in clear cases of asymmetry in the contribution of
each cohabitant, it would be artificial to adhere to the equal division rule.
Consequently, according to the pluralist theory, in cases of clear asymmetry
between partners' contributions, cohabitation law and marriage law diverge. In
cases of marriage, pluralist theory advocates the equal division rule. In
contrast, in cases of cohabitants under the same circumstances, the pluralist
theory advocates a regular property rule, augmented by compensation to the
domestic cohabitant for her actual contribution.2 5
b. Inheritance, Gifts, and Property Acquired Before Cohabitation
Based on contribution theory, most states traditionally distinguish between
assets that were acquired during the marriage by the couples' labor (hereinafter
Lab property) and inheritance, gifts, and property that had been acquired before
marriage (hereinafter Luck property).216 The former reflects both spouses' joint
effort, including the domestic partner's contribution and hence is subject to the
equal division rule, while the latter is typically not a product of ajoint venture
and thus is considered private property, that is, property that is not subject to
217division.
2m
Recently, however a few scholars have challenged the Lab-Luck
distinction,218 arguing, based on the egalitarian community ideal, that the
community ideal of sharing a life together must result in converging at least
215. Cf Garrison, supra note 15, at 884-89 (suggesting that complementary doctrines like
unjust enrichment should replace marital property law in the case of cohabitants). My approach
differs from that of Garrison in two aspects. First, in standard cases I support the equal division
rule as the default. Second, the regular principles of unjust enrichment should be adapted to the
spousal relationship context.
216. See, e.g., Frantz & Dagan, supra note 27, at 89-90 (identifying the different treatment
given to property acquired by the couple's labor and property acquired by good fortune).
217. See Motro, supra note 29, at 1631-37 (describing, at length, the marital property rule
and the separate property rule); Oldham, supra note 202, at 220-21 (discussing the distinction
between "marital" property and "separate" or "nonmarital" property). It should be noted,
however, that even the contribution theory does not fully explain the Lab-Luck distinction. For
example, the couple's behavior influences the motivation of the gift giver or the inheritor. See,
e.g., Motro, supra note 29, at 1640 (discussing the difficulty in categorizing certain types of
property achieved during marriage).
218. See Motro, supra note 29, at 1649 ("[Marriage] is about two people joining the risks
and rewards of their lives: merging their fates, committing to be 'in the same boat,' to sink or
swim together, to contribute unequally at times if that's what it takes to keep the union afloat.").
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part of the separate property into community property.219 Even beyond
scholarship, many states recently began to recognize the transmutation of
separate property into marital property in cases involving mingling of sources,
an implied contract, orjoint use--especially of the family home.220 Going one
step further in this direction, ALI recommends a bright line rule that would
transfer an increasing percentage of separate property into marital property
based on the length of the marriage.221
Unlike marital law, cohabitation property law should be based on the
contribution theory. Thus in cases of cohabitation, it makes sense to adhere to
the traditional exclusion of non-lab property from the joint marital assets. This
system suits the autonomy grounding of this institution.
Interestingly, even the ALI principles, the archetype of the status model to
equate marriage and cohabitation regulation, consider it inappropriate to blur
the distinction between Lab-Luck properties in the case of cohabitants. 222 Yet,
ALI fails to explain this intuition.223 The pluralist model explains why dividing
traditional "private" property is undesirable in the case of cohabitants even if it
is justified in the case of marriage.
c. Increased Human Capital
Another area where the pluralist model distinguishes between marriage
and cohabitation is the case of human capital that has increased during marriage
219. See id. at 1641-44 (suggesting a formulation for transmutation of separate property
into marital property); Frantz & Dagan, supra note 27, at 117-19 (arguing that gifts and
inheritance, even though acquired during the marriage as separate property, should be classified
as marital property); Lifshitz, supra note 199, at 702-19 (supporting the conversion of separate
property into marital property in cases of long-term relationships that were characterized by a
shared life).
220. See Motro, supra note 29, at 1641 ("Many states recognize the transmutation of
separate property into marital property where separate and marital funds have been commingled,
and a few states allow for transmutation where separate property was used by both parties .... "
(citation omitted)); Oldham, supra note 202, at 221-33 (surveying techniques of commingling
separate property into marital property); see also Lifshitz, supra note 199, at 677-81 (describing
similar developments in Israeli law).
221. See ALI, supra note 6, at 769-70 ("The percentage of separate property that is re-
characterized as marital property under Paragraph (1) should be determined by the duration of
the marriage, according to a formula specified in a rule of statewide application."); see also
Lifshitz, supra note 199, at 706-07.
222. See ALI, supra note 6, at 938 (stating that private property is not converted to marital
property in the case of long-term cohabitation).
223. See id. at 940 (stating that no state converts separate property into marital property in
case of cohabitants but failing to explain why).
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(for example, academic or professional degrees, personal reputation, and a
license). Even leaving aside cohabitation law, the inclusion of human capital
that increased during marriage in the marital property estate is a complex issue
that exposes unsettled tensions within marriage law.
On one hand, until recently, most states refused to include enhanced
human capital within the marital estate.224 While formal justifications for this
reluctance, such as "human capital is not property 225 and difficulties in
calculation 2 2 6 are far from convincing, 227 the more serious objections to
division of earning capacity are based on autonomy.228 First, symbolically,
human capital division contradicts individualistic perception of efforts and
skills as personal.229 Second, unlike other marital property, human capital is
divided in the post-divorce period and as a function of the actual salary of both
224. See Frantz & Dagan, supra note 27, at 107 ("Currently, most jurisdictions refuse to
include increased earning capacity within the marital estate.").
225. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Graham, 574 P.2d 75, 77 (Colo. 1978) (stating that
educational degrees are not property, and thus should not be included in the marital estate);
Stevens v. Stevens, 492 N.E.2d 131, 133 (Ohio 1986) (same); see also Ellman, supra note 166,
at 69 (arguing that degrees and licenses are not property).
226. See, e.g., Drapek v. Drapek, 503 N.E.2d 946, 949 (Mass. 1987) ("Since assigning a
present value to a professional degree would involve evaluating the earning potential created by
that degree, we also decline to include the professional degree or license as a marital
asset .... "); Wehrkamp v. Wehrkamp, 357 N.W.2d 264,267 (S.D. 1984) ("[The equities to be
adjusted between the parties vary with the facts and circumstances of each particular case.").
227. Regarding the formalist objection, see ALl, supra note 6, at 652 ("The definition of
marital property must follow from the policy choice; the policy choice is not determined by the
definition."). Regarding the calculation objection, see, for example, Frantz & Dagan, supra note
27, at 112 ("We do not deny that such valuations will be difficult. But it will likely be no more
burdensome (and the calculations will be no more uncertain) than similar valuations that are
currently done, particularly in tort actions."), and Joyce Davis, Enhanced Earning
Capacity/Human Capital: The Reluctance to Call It Property, 17 WOMEN'S RTs. L. REP. 109,
118 (1996) ("On a daily basis, in courts all over the country, judges and juries calculate the
value of various losses and interests .... ).
228. See Frantz & Dagan, supra note 27, at 109-10 ("Future earning capacity is seen as an
individual accomplishment, indeed a constitutive component of the individual self."); see also
Lifshitz, supra note 199, at 733-40.
229. See Jana B. Singer, Husbands, Wives, and Human Capital: Why the Shoe Won't Fit,
31 FAM. L.Q. 119, 125-26 (1997) (analyzing the confrontation between human capital division
and the values of autonomy and self-ownership).
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spouses at those times.230 Thus, human capital division harms the right of
complete exit from any spousal commitments.
231
On the other hand-beyond its individualistic character--one should not
ignore the community aspect of career development during marriage.232
Economic research shows that increased human capital is one of the main assets
acquired during marriage. 233 It is not surprising, then, that the reluctance of
current law to include it within the marital property results in extremely
unequal economic outcomes between men and women at divorce. 3 Thus, the
egalitarian and community aspects of marriage oppose ignoring an increase in
human capital.235
Taking into account the importance of community and equality in
marriage regulation, prominent scholars support the inclusion of the increase in
human capital in the marital estate, despite the autonomy objection.236
According to these views, the autonomy objection justifies a different technique
of division but not ignoring human capital altogether.237 In this light, new cases
230. Theoretically, the domestic partner's contribution to the marital capital should be
perceived as a constant amount debt that is paid during the post-divorce years, regardless of the
actual income of the "provider." This method, however, will lead to severe injustice if the
provider does not intend to continue with his previous career or in cases that his actual income
is less than the estimated one.
231. Cf Robert J. Levy, A Reminiscence About the Uniform Marriage andDivorce Act-
And Some Reflections About Its Critics and Its Polices, 1991 BYIU L. REv. 43, 60 (pointing to
the clash between the clean-break and human capital division).
232. See Frantz & Dagan, supra note 27, at 110 ("Careers involve collective decision
making and collective action .... ).
233. See Joan M. Krauskopf, Recompense for Financing Spouse's Education: Legal
Protection for the MaritalInvestor in Human Capital, 28 U. KAN. L. REV. 379, 386-88 (1980)
(explaining the importance of human capital for marital property law). See generally GARY S.
BECKER, HUMAN CAPITAL (1964) (providing an economic analysis of the human capital
concept).
234. See LENORE J. WErrZMAN, THE DIVORCE REvOLUTION: THE UNEXPECTED SOCIAL AND
ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES FOR WOMEN AND CHILDREN IN AMERICA 110-42 (1985) (asserting
that human capital explains severe gaps between the financial consequences of men and women
upon divorce).
235. See Frantz & Dagan, supra note 27, at 113-14 (arguing for dividing increase to
human capital in light of the egalitarian community ideal); see also Lifshitz, supra note 199, at
728-33 (arguing that ignoring the increase of human capital harms the main rationales of
marital property law).
236. See Krauskopf, supra note 233, at 386-88, 417 (providing early support for the
division of human capital); WErrzmAN, supra note 234, at 387-88 (stating that the states should
include human capital in the definition of marital assets and divide it among the parties upon
divorce); see also Frantz & Dagan, supra note 27, at 107-08 (showing more recent support for
the division of human capital as marital property).
237. See Frantz & Dagan, supra note 27, at 107-08 ("A commitment to the ideal of
marriage as an egalitarian liberal community requires treating spouses' increased earning
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in New York2 38 and in legal systems outside of the United States239 challenge
the traditional rule, instead dividing increases in human capital. Other
jurisdictions do not divide increases in human capital, but are open to including
human capital as a factor in the court's discretionary considerations regarding
marital property division.24°
Going back to the pluralist model, I believe that here again marital
property law and cohabitation property law should differ. In the context of
marriage, the model's commitment to marriage as an egalitarian ideal should
not result in the model's exclusion of consideration of increases in human
capital.24 l Cohabitation, in contrast, is an autonomy-based institution.242 The
community consideration in favor of human capital division, thus, is weakened,
while the autonomy-based objection grows stronger-especially the harm to the
right of exit principle. As such, the model opposes dividing the increase in
human capital between cohabitants. Yet, even the pluralist model should not
ignore cases of long-term relationships in which one partner significantly
contributed to the other partner's career and sacrificed his or her own
development. Complimentary remedies, such as career losses compensation,
should handle those cases. The next Part discusses these remedies.
capacity as marital property, while tailoring property division rules to address the unique
features of this asset.").
238. See O'Brien v. O'Brien, 489 N.E.2d 712, 713-14, 716 (N.Y. 1985) (holding that a
medical license earned during marriage is marital property).
239. For an example from Israeli law, see CA 4623/04 Unidentified Person (male) v.
Unidentified Person (female) (Aug. 26, 2007).
240. See Erik V. Wicks, Professional Degree Divorces: Of Equity Positions, Equitable
Distributions, and Clean Breaks, 45 WAYNE L. REv. 1975, 2000-01 (2000) (discussing a
Michigan decision that recognized an ex-wife's claim to opportunity costs incurred during the
ex-husband's pursuit of a law degree); Susan E. Keller, The Rhetoric of Marriage, Achievement,
and Power: An Analysis of Judicial Opinions Considering the Treatment of Professional
Degrees as Marital Property, 21 VT. L. REV. 409, 432-35 (1996) (identifying a judicial
approach that rejects the notion of a professional degree as marital property while granting more
generous awards in light of contributions made during marriage to the ex-spouse's pursuit of
such a degree).
241. Frantz and Dagan's support for dividing human capital prioritizes the community
ideal over autonomy. See Frantz & Dagan, supra note 27, at 113-14 ("[S]pouses should be
expected to share the benefits and burdens of their life together, not those of their lives before
(or after) the existence of the marital community."). However, a more balanced approach than
this is needed, even in the case of married couples. Thus, alternative remedies, like the
disproportional division of regular property at divorce, are preferable to the division of human
capital by splitting the couples' post-divorce incomes. This issue deserves a more extended
discussion, yet such discussion is beyond the scope of this article.
242. See, e.g., Garrison, supra note 15, at 839-41 (showing that cohabitants generally
retain significant independence during cohabitation).
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D. Spousal Support and Compensation for Loss-of-Career
1. Models of Spousal Support and Compensation for Career Loss
Traditional alimony. The obligation to pay alimony traditionally has
embodied three elements. First, it was a gender-based model; only men were
required to pay alimony. Second, the obligation lasted for an indefinite
period--either until the woman died or until she remarried. Third, only fault
men, men found guilty of having caused the dissolution of the spousal bond,
were obligated to pay alimony. 3
Rehabilitative maintenance. During the second half of the twentieth
century, many states almost abolished the traditional model of long-term
alimony. In its place, a new model of rehabilitative maintenance payments was
framed. According to the new model, maintenance payments are to be given
for a short period and their aim is to provide the spouse, who was supported
economically during the relationship, with a short recovery period which will
allow her to adjust to independent living.244 The underlying ideology of the
new model was the individualistic clean break principle, which envisions that a• r " • 245
divorce terminates any economic relationship between the divorcing couple.
The revival of long-term alimony. Although the traditional model of
alimony was abandoned in most western countries, not all countries adopted the
rehabilitative maintenance model in its stead.246 Additionally, a counter-trend
to the clean break principle emerged, which advocates extending the support
duty beyond the rehabilitation period.247 The reason for this modem revival of
243. See Ellman, supra note 166, at 5-6 (describing traditional alimony law); see also June
Carbone, The Futility of Coherence: The ALI's Principles of the Law of Family Dissolution,
Compensatory Spousal Payments, 4 J.L. & FAM. STuD. 43, 46-47 (2002) (highlighting the
historic roots of alimony law in the United States).
244. See, e.g., Ellman, supra note 166, at 22 (describing the rehabilitative maintenance
model adopted by some modem courts); see also Turner v. Turner, 385 A.2d 1280, 1282-83
(N.J. 1978) (outlining the purposes of the rehabilitative model and its benefit of facilitating a
clean break between the parties).
245. See, e.g., O'Brien v. O'Brien, 489 N.E.2d 712, 716 (N.Y. 1985) (stating that the
rehabilitative model replaced the concept of traditional alimony so as to facilitate the severance
of the parties "economic ties"); see also Herma H. Kay, An Appraisal of California's No-Fault
Divorce Law, 75 CAL. L. REV. 291,313 (1987) (discussing the clean-break principle as a central
tenet of the no-fault divorce philosophy).
246. See Joan M. Krauskopf Theories of Property Division/Spousal Support: Searching
for Solutions to the Mystery, 23 FAM. L.Q. 253, 264 (1989) (stating that even prior to the
passage of divorce reform statutes in America, some countries had replaced the traditional
model of alimony with a compensatory model based on lost earning capacity).
247. See Mary K. Kisthardt, Re-thinking Alimony: The AAML's Considerations for
Calculating Alimony, Spousal Support or Maintenance, 21 J. AM. AcAD. MATRIMoNIAL L. 61,
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long-term alimony law is the recognition that, in spite of the seemingly
egalitarian divide of marital property, the domestic partners-most of the time
women-are severely economically disadvantaged by divorce.248 Yet, modem
spousal support law operates without any guiding ideology, which led to
confusion and a lack of uniformity, even regarding the most substantive
component of support law.249 Thus, several jurisdictions abandoned the gender
bias of the traditional model but continue to base the modem support
mechanism partly or fully on fault notions (modem fault based alimony).25 ° A
second version of modem long-term support law abandons the concept of fault
and focuses on the needs of the economically weaker party.251 This version is
sometimes justified in the legal scholarship by analogy to an insurance
agreement (need based support).252 The third-and most radical version-
suggests sharing the income of both members of the couple following divorce
(the income sharing model).253 This model is similar in its approach to those
68-69 (describing a wave of reform in the 1990s that justified alimony awards exceeding mere
rehabilitative need).
248. See WErrZMAN, supra note 234, at 323-56 (comparing the economic benefits of
divorce for men with the economic costs of divorce for women); Jana B. Singer, Divorce
Reform and Gender Justice, 67 N.C. L. REV. 1103, 1104 (1989) ("Although women's standard
of living drops dramatically as a result of divorce, men's standard of living typically
improves."); James B. McLindon, Separate but Unequal: The Economic Disaster of Divorce
for Women and Children, 21 FAM. L.Q. 351, 353 (1987) (noting the disparate economic impact
of divorce on men and women and calling for reform in the name of gender justice).
249. See Ann L. Estin, Maintenance, Alimony, and the Rehabilitation of Family Care,
71 N.C. L. REV. 721, 741 (1993) ("One recurring difficulty in contemporary divorce law has
been the problem of grounding alimony and maintenance awards in a coherent theory.");
Margaret F. Brinig & June Carbone, The Reliance Interest in Marriage andDivorce, 62 TUL. L.
REV. 855, 882-94 (1988) (illustrating the inconsistency, confusion, and absence of a clear
theory in spousal support case law); see also Ellman, supra note 166, at 4 ("[A]limony awards
as well as their rationales vary from jurisdiction to jurisdiction and from case to case.").
250. See, e.g., ALl, supra note 6, at 42-49 (surveying jurisdictions that continue to include
fault as a factor in their alimony law).
251. See, e.g., WErrZMAN, supra note 234, at 149 ("While traditional alimony sought to
deliver moral justice based on past behavior of the parties, the new alimony was to deliver
economic justice based on the financial needs of the parties.").
252. See Scott & Scott, supra note 19, at 1272-73, 1312-13 (drawing the analogy between
modem need-based alimony and insurance contract); see also Michael J. Trebilcock & Rosemin
Keshvani, The Role of Private Ordering in Family Law: A Law and Economics Perspective, 41
U. TORoNTo L.J. 533, 539 (1991) (demonstrating the development of the insurance model
analogy to the alimony concept).
253. See June Carbone, Income Sharing: Redefining the Family in Terms of Community,
31 Hous. L. REV. 359, 362-63 (1994) (describing the variety of income sharing approaches);
Cynthia Starnes, Divorce and the Displaced Homemaker: A Discourse on Playing with Dolls,
Partnership Buyouts and Dissociation Under No-Fault, 60 U. CHI. L. REv. 67, 129-37 (1993)
(offering the income sharing model from a partnership perspective); Jane Rutherford, Duty in
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that include human capital in the marital property. Yet, it prefers the support
law umbrella and techniques to those of property law.254
Compensation for loss-of-career. Twenty years ago, Ira Ellman suggested
an innovative model for spousal payment following divorce.2 5 Unlike the
conventional model that focused on the future-namely the partners' needs and
incomes after divorce-this model focused on the career losses of the domestic
partner during marriage.256 According to this model, the domestic partner
should be compensated for her loss of earning capacity during marriage. 2 7 The
compensation should be paid after divorce as a lump-sum, or as periodic
payments, depending on the circumstances. This model gained support among
other scholars28 and was adopted as the guiding model of ALI.259
2. Imposing Spousal Support and Compensation for Career Loss on
Cohabitants
Should any of these models be applied to cohabitants? Fault based
alimony is grounded in a perception of marriage as a commitment for life.
According to this perception, the one who initiates the separation breaches the
marital contract, and alimony serves as compensation for such breach.260 This
Divorce: Shared Income as a Path to Equality, 58 FORDHAM L. REv. 539, 584 (1990)
(perceiving income sharing as a path to equalizing standards of living after divorce).
254. See Frantz & Dagan, supra note 27, at 105-06 (expressing preference for the marital
property division approach because of its emphasis on ownership instead of charity and pity,
while also acknowledging the need to supplement property division with maintenance payments
in order to achieve gender equality); see also Krauskopf, supra note 246, at 255-56
(highlighting the common legislative and judicial practice of meddling the support payment
framework with the property division framework in an attempt to achieve equitable results).
255. See Ellman, supra note 166, at 12 ("[T]his Article outlines an alternative theory of
alimony designed to encourage socially beneficial sharing behavior in marriage by requiring
compensation for lost earning capacity arising from that behavior.").
256. See id. at 49 (advancing a theory of alimony as compensation for losses in earning
capacity suffered during marriage because of the adoption of traditional marriage roles).
257. According to Ellman, however, the domestic partner is entitled to compensation only
in cases where her losses stem from the contribution to her partner's career, or from taking
primary care of the spouse's children. Id. at 73.
258. See JoHN EEKELAAR, FAMILY LAW AND PERSONAL LiFE 51-52 (2006) (preferring
compensation for loss over future need-based alimony).
259. See ALI, supra note 6, at 789 ("The principle conceptual innovation of this Chapter is
therefore to recharacterize the remedy it provides as compensation for loss rather than relief of
need.")
260. See Brinig & Carbone, supra note 249, at 875-76 (describing the contractual logic of
the traditional model with reference to fault's role in protecting reliance and expectation
interests).
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rationale was eviscerated by the modem move of divorce law from fault to no-
fault unilateral divorce.261 Needless to say, the pluralist model, with its
individualistic emphasis and its resistance to imposing societal ethos on
cohabitants, opposes the imposition of fault-based alimony on cohabitants.
The no-fault versions of modem long-term spousal support recognize the
right to end the marriage unilaterally.262 Yet these models continue the need-
based responsibility, or sharing between couples, for substantially long-
sometimes unlimited-periods of time after the official divorce.263  They
severely limit the autonomy of the partners as individuals, and especially hinder
their right of exit. This is exactly the reason for a pluralist distinction between
marriage and cohabitation: In the case of marriage, the community aspect of
marriage justifies, at least in certain circumstances, need-based alimony
grounded in the insurance rationale. 264 However, taking into account the
substantive burden that long-term alimony imposes on couples' autonomy, the
pluralist theory insists that the law should design other spousal alternatives that
give priority to the partners' absolute right of exit. 265 Thus, according to the
pluralist model, cohabitation law should not adopt any formulation of unlimited
266long-term alimony.
It may be appropriate, though, to apply rehabilitative maintenance
principles to cohabitants. First, rehabilitative alimony is based on extra-
contractual considerations that are certainly relevant to cohabitants.26 7
Furthermore, in the case of cohabitation, there is no need for formal divorce to
261. See ALl, supra note 6, at 807 ("But the law does not require an alimony claimant to
show that the other spouse breached, nor would such a requirement be consistent with modem
no-fault principles.").
262. See Scott & Scott, supra note 19, at 1309 ("Under a no-fault regime, each spouse has
a unilateral right to terminate marriage and the norm of lifelong obligation has been replaced by
a principle of individual freedom to renege.").
263. Id. at 1311 ("The relational model visualizes permanent alimony as a claim by an
insured party who is permanently foreclosed from the labor market.... At some point, she will
be unlikely to recoup her lost opportunity cost without a permanent subsidy from her former
spouse.").
264. In light of the fact that autonomy plays a substantive role even in the case of marriage,
the insurance rationale for support payments is preferable to the income sharing rationale.
Furthermore, the availability of such support should be limited to those long-term relationships
where there is economic reliance.
265. See Frantz & Dagan, supra note 27, at 119-20 (stating that long-term alimony is
disfavored because it interferes with the freedom to exit the relationship).
266. But see Scott, supra note 19, at 342-45 (arguing for insurance-based alimony in cases
involving five or more years of cohabitation).
267. See Ellman, supra note 166, at 22-23 (demonstrating that the concept of rehabilitative
alimony stems from the judiciary's exercise of"equitable discretion" rather than from contract
theory).
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untie the bond between the two partners, and either party may choose to
terminate the relationship unilaterally and with immediate effect. Accordingly,
when we consider the case of an economically dependent cohabitant, the
implication is that a sudden interruption of the economic commitment upon the
breakdown of the relationship will seriously disadvantage the economically
dependent partner. Thus, the extra-contractual considerations that justify
rehabilitative alimony in the case of cohabitants are even stronger than the
parallel considerations in the case of married spouses. Finally, rehabilitative
alimony by definition is limited to a short period, and thus does not threaten the
pluralist model's commitment to the right of exit.
268
So far, this Article explains why the pluralist model firmly opposes long-
term unlimited spousal support but supports rehabilitative maintenance for
cohabitants. The model is, however, more ambivalent regarding compensation
for loss-of-career opportunity during cohabitation.
On one hand, the model objects to such compensation since it is being
paid after separation and might lead to long-term (albeit not unlimited)
commitment. 269  Thus, imposition of such compensation payments on
cohabitants might clash with the design of cohabitation as an autonomy-based
institution and harm the partners' right of exit.
On the other hand, the model may support such compensation, since
compensation for loss-of-career reflects restitution/unjust enrichment logic,
which is extra-contractual in its nature. 270 Furthermore, a compensation for
financial losses is essentially payment of debt that was created during the
marriage/cohabitation period. Hence, unlike classic alimony, it is past-oriented
payment.
Given the nature of the contradictory considerations, it seems that the
compensation for loss-of-career demonstrates the importance of distinguishing
between different types of cohabitants. As long as we discuss "regular
cohabitants," the ex ante rationales for distinguishing marriage and
268. See, e.g., Turner v. Turner, 385 A.2d 1280, 1282-83 (N.J. 1978) (stating that
rehabilitative alimony necessarily implies a time limitation because its purpose is to facilitate
each party's pursuit of a new life).
269. Cf. Ellman, supra note 166, at 49-53 (explaining a model for alimony awards based
on restoring losses in earning capacity that seems likely to generate substantial continuing
commitments between former spouses).
270. See, e.g., ALl, supra note 6, at 792-93 ("[C]ontinuing obligations between former
spouses depend less on explicit agreement and promise than on their relationship itself .... ");
see also Herma H. Kay, Beyond No Fault: New Directions in Divorce Reform, in DIVORCE
REFORM AT THE CROSSROADS 6, 32-33 (Stephen D. Sugarman & Henna H. Kay eds., 1990)
(exposing the connection between loss of earning capacity and restitution or unjust enrichment
remedies).
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cohabitation, the autonomy value that encourages the partners towards
independence, and the commitment to a right of exit should overcome the ex
post extra-contractual consideration. The basic package of cohabitant law,
thus, should not include loss-of-career compensation. Yet, in cases of long-
term relationships that are accompanied by economic dependency, a different
balance is needed, and loss-of-career compensation should be imposed on
cohabitants. The next subpart addresses the unique features of long-term
cohabitation and its suggested regulation according to the pluralist theory.
E. Relational Commitments Between Long-Term Cohabitants
So far, this Article has discussed the scope of rights and duties that the
pluralist model offers for regular cohabitants. To balance between the ex ante
distinguishing rationales and the ex post extra-contractual considerations, the
pluralist model provides a narrow and flexible contribution-based marital
property regime accompanied by entitlement to short-term rehabilitative
maintenance. During long-term cohabitation, however, the previous
equilibrium between ex ante and ex post perspectives is changed. First, in the
case of long-term relationships-especially those accompanied by economic
dependency and specification of roles-extra-contractual considerations like
protecting weaker, dependent parties, take on a greater weight.271 Second,
during their cohabitating years, cohabitants usually deviate from their ex ante
historical decision and develop a relational commitment.272
Against this background, the pluralist theory defines significant
cohabitation periods273 accompanied by behavior and declarations that express
mutual commitments as relational cohabitations.274 It posits relational
cohabitations in the midway between marriage and cohabitation. In the context
of post-separation spousal support, the pluralist model goes beyond regular
cohabitation law and provides the domestic partner compensation for her career
271. See Ellman, supra note 18, at 1370-73 (appealing to examples from case law to
demonstrate the inability of the contractual model to adequately account for and remedy the
losses suffered by weaker parties upon the dissolution of a long-term cohabitation relationship).
272. See Blumberg, supra note 18, at 1296 ("[D]omestic partners may fail to marry for
many reasons .... [S]ome may have been unhappy in prior marriages and therefore wish to
avoid the form of marriage, even as they enjoy its substance with a domestic partner. Some
begin a casual relationship that develops into a durable union.... ").
273. The exact period of time is not rigidly set, and it might change according to different
sociological variables. Ten years of cohabitation is a plausible, rough estimation.
274. For an explanation of the difference between the objective, extra-contractual entry
criteria for regular cohabitation status and the more consensual nature of entry requirements for
relational cohabitation, see supra Part IV.A.
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loss. Yet, in order to distinguish between marriage and long-term cohabitation,
it still denies the right to unlimited need-based alimony, as this kind of alimony
undermines the autonomy basis of cohabitation. As an expression of the
relational commitments between cohabitants, the pluralist model goes beyond
the contribution rationale in the context of marital property law. Thus, as in the
case of married partners, it inflexibly applies the equal division rule, even in
275thcases of clear gaps between the partners' contributions. Yet, under the
influence of the autonomy rationale, those extensions are applied only to assets
that were acquired during marriage from labor but not to "luck assets" and
human capital.276




Model Sharing Mixed Model Contribution
Ideal
Inflexible Inflexible Flexible
Property Lab Assets Equal Equal Equal
Law Division Division Division
Luck Assets Yes No No
Human Capital Yes No No
Rehabilitative Yes Yes Yes
Spousal Compensation
Support for Loss-of- Yes Yes No
Law Career
Need-Based Yes No No
F. Opting Out of Cohabitation Commitments
While the relational aspects of cohabitation extend cohabitants' regular
commitments, in making opting-out agreements, the partners seek to narrow
their commitments. The existing approaches towards cohabitants' opting-out
275. Cf Frantz & Dagan, supra note 27, at 104-05 (rejecting investment or contribution
based division rules for former spouses because they are antithetical to communitarian ideas and
threaten to "reinforce problematic gender roles").
276. See Motro, supra note 29, at 1624-25 (defining "luck assets" as property generated by
gift or inheritance).
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agreements are divided between the status and the contractual approaches. 77
Status-based approaches that equate marriage with cohabitation subject
cohabitants' agreements to unique procedural requirements and substantive
judicial review that exceed regular contract standards. 78 Those requirements
and standards make opting out from cohabitation law commitments extremely
difficult.279 At times, certain cohabitation commitments and even the definition
of the couples as cohabitants become mandatory.280 In contrast, the contractual
approaches validate cohabitants' opting-out agreements according to regular
contractual standards.28'
The pluralist model balances between the competing approaches. On one
hand, the pluralist model rejects the status model's equation of cohabitant and
married partners' agreements. Couples' autonomy to choose their own lifestyle
is a cornerstone of the pluralist design of cohabitation as an institution. Thus,
while in certain legal systems certain components of marriage are mandatory,
282
277. Allowing cohabitants to opt out of their commitments by agreement is only necessary,
of course, under approaches whose default rules impose marriage commitments on cohabitants.
Consequently, this Article refers in this Part to the contractual and status models for equating
marriage and cohabitation.
278. See, e.g., ALI, supra note 6, at 907-08 (applying the unique marital contract regime to
agreements between cohabitants).
279. See Westfall, supra note 15, at 1480-84 (criticizing ALl for applying marital contract
rules to agreements between cohabitants and referencing cases in which the strict nature of those
rules would severely hamper cohabitants' abilities to contract out of marriage law
commitments); see also Atkin, supra note 190, at 810 (explaining that the unique fairness
review applied to cohabitants' opt-out contracts in New Zealand has historically made it
difficult for partners to opt out of cohabitant law commitments).
280. See, e.g., Lifshitz, supra note 100, at 375 (addressing the limitations on cohabitants'
freedom of contract in Israel).
281. See supra Part ILE.1 (detailing the contractual approach to dealing with opt-out
agreements). Although regular contractual approaches might enable partners to opt out of their
commitments even by clear ex ante unilateral clarification, Elizabeth Scott suggests a more
stringent requirement of a formal written opt-out contract to protect the weaker parties. See
Scott, supra note 19, at 343-44 ("To enhance this protection [for vulnerable partners], courts
can require a written agreement as clear evidence of the parties' intentions to opt out of their
financial obligations to one another.").
282. See, e.g., Maynard v. Hill, 125 U.S. 190, 211 (1888) ("Other contracts may be
modified, restricted, or enlarged, or entirely released upon the consent of the parties. Not so
with marriage. The relation once formed, the law steps in and holds the parties to various
obligations and liabilities."). In modem legal systems there is greater willingness to recognize
contractual arrangements. See, e.g., Brian Bix, Bargaining in the Shadow of Love: The
Enforcement of Premarital Agreements and How We ThinkAbout Marriage, 40 WM. & MARY
L. REV. 145, 151 (1998) ("The vast majority of courts, however, now treat[] premarital
agreements as enforceable, at least in some circumstances."). Yet, there is still a lot of
ambiguity regarding the validation of certain marital agreements. See, e.g., Laura P. Graham,
The Uniform Premarital Agreement Act and Modern Social Policy: The Enforceability of
Premarital Agreements Regulating the Ongoing Marriage, 28 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 1037,
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the pluralist model opposes such classifications of cohabitation law
components. The pluralist model points to an important difference between
marriage and cohabitation in this context. In the case of marriage, the decision
whether or not to get married and to thereby take on those mandatory
obligations is a voluntary decision of the parties involved. Living as
cohabitants, on the other hand, is not a voluntary act intending legal
significance, but rather a factual situation. Legal treatment of certain
obligations between cohabitants as mandatory, therefore, means that no
cohabitant-in any circumstance-could avoid such mutual commitments. In
practice, it totally negates the option of living as a cohabitant without mutual
legal binding commitments. While such a paternalistic, protective attitude
might be justified under certain circumstances, its application to all cohabitants
is not justified in terms of autonomy and equality. For similar reasons, the
pluralist model is also suspicious of regulation that rigidly presumes that
contractual deviation from cohabitation default law is unfair and thus invalid.2"'
On the other hand, the pluralist model's sensitivity to power gaps between
cohabitants, appreciation of extra-contractual considerations, and awareness of
the dynamic aspects of spousal relationships lead it to reject the regular
contractual standards as adequate for cohabitants. Taking into account this
variety of considerations, the pluralist model also supports a nuanced approach
that distinguishes between cohabitant types, aspects of cohabitation law, and
the circumstances of the creation of contract. The model distinguishes between
arguments regarding the formation of the agreement and arguments regarding
its execution. Regarding the former, the pluralist model distinguishes between
neutral-egalitarian circumstances and situations that raise suspicion of
exploitation.
Neutral-egalitarian situations include childless cohabitants who formed an
agreement before they decided to live together or during their three-year trial-
period. In this initial stage of their relationships, the parties are still
independent and thus the claim that they did not have substantial freedom of
1038 (1993) ("[T]here has been a significant lack of uniformity among the various states as to
the treatment of premarital agreements."); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS
§ 190 (1981) (limiting the enforceability of marital agreements that are contrary to the public
interest in marriage relationships); Servidea, supra note 152, at 535 (suggesting a public interest
approach to the pre-marital agreement).
283. See ALI, supra note 6, at 982-84 (providing a regulatory model that subjects
premarital agreements to a fairness test); see also Scott, supra note 19, at 341 (stating that the
ALI regime provides parties with no assurance that their agreements to limited commitments
will be enforced); Atkin, supra note 190, at 810 (describing new legislation in New Zealand
designed to limit the courts in their ability to invalidate cohabitants' opt-out agreements on the
basis of unfairness).
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choice is relatively weak. Also under these circumstances, the waiving of
cohabitants' rights is prospective, so the parties have the opportunity to plan
their behavior in advance. Thus, ordinary contract law rules are sufficient for
reviewing arguments regarding contract formation in neutral-egalitarian
situations.284
The situations that raise suspicions of exploitation include pregnant
mothers, joint-parent cohabitants, and childless cohabitants that are entering the
agreement after the trial period. In those contexts, the dependency between the
285partners usually increases and with it the potential for exploitation.
Furthermore, in those agreements, the parties are waiving not only on
prospective but also on existing rights. Accordingly, while the pluralist model
might validate opting-out agreements even in those circumstances, it subjects
them to unique procedural requirements and substantive fairness review.
286
Finally, even if a contract was fair at the time of its formation, it does not
necessarily remain fair at the time of its execution. Thus, according to the
pluralist model, regardless of the circumstances at the time of the contract's
formation, the courts should review the fairness of opting-out agreements at the
time of their execution if, post-formation, children were born to previously
childless cohabitants, unexpected circumstances occurred, or significant
cohabitation periods had passed.287
284. To be sure, financial gaps between men and women in our society, as well as
differences in their alternatives in the marriage market, improve men's position in certain
bargains, even in the so-called egalitarian situation. Yet, it still seems fair that if one of the
partners honestly clarified to the other at the beginning of the relationship, before reliance was
created, that she does not want to take on the legal commitment of marriage, and though the
other partner may have not liked it, he eventually accepted it, the law should validate this
agreement.
285. See Ellman, supra note 18, at 1371 ("Young persons in their twenties, with no
children, few responsibilities, and many prospects in front of them, may see little reason to bind
themselves to lifetime obligations that could outlast their mutual affection."); see also ALl,
supra note 6, at 987 ("Once they are parents, the effect of the terms they earlier agreed upon are
therefore likely to seem quite different than they expected when childless.").
286. In these aspects, this model converges with ALI's approach, which developed
doctrines in the context of marital contracts such as extended disclosure, independent
counseling requirements, and fairness review and then applied them to cohabitants' agreements.
See ALI, supra note 6, at 907-08, 959-1003 (demonstrating the application of such doctrines to
both marital contracts and cohabitants' agreements). While ALl applies those doctrines to all
cohabitants, the pluralist model differs by applying them only selectively.
287. Cf id. at 982-83 (enabling courts to set aside an agreement if its enforcement leads to
substantial injustice). Thus, in those circumstances, the pluralist model rejects the standard
contractual approach and moves closer to the status approach. Yet, according to the pluralist
model, the ex post fairness review of the agreement should not necessarily result in the
invalidation of opt-out contracts. For example, assume that two childless, financially
independent cohabitants, one of whom is wealthier, initially opt out of the equitable division
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V. Toward Pluralist Theory of Spousal Regulation
Beyond cohabitation law, the pluralist theory offers a fresh look at other
fields of spousal regulation. Under the pluralist approach, the liberal state
should positively encourage diversity and strengthen autonomy by recognizing
and designing new spousal institutions beyond the existing menus. The
regulation of such institutions should follow the three cornerstones of the
pluralist approach: substantive freedom of choice, tolerance of different
lifestyles limited by state responsibility to prevent exploitation and
subordinations, and right of exit. The next Part will use the pluralist approach
to shed new light on three controversial topics: same-sex marriage and civil
unions, covenant marriage, and secular regulation of religious marriage.
A. Same-Sex Marriage and Civil Unions
The pluralist rationales for not imposing marriage commitments on
cohabitation are definitely inapplicable for partners that are restricted from
marriage---such as same-sex partners. The case of same-sex couples has
therefore been a dominant force in the movement to impose marriage law on
cohabitants.288 In a similar vein, the situation of couples that are restricted from
marriage in other jurisdictions was a dominant force in the emerging trends within
those jurisdictions to blur any distinction between marriage and cohabitation.289
But, just like opposite-sex couples, there are some same-sex couples that would
prefer not to get married even if they could. As this Article has demonstrated,
blurring the distinction between marriage and cohabitation undermines the
meaning of both social institutions and hence negates the ex ante screening of
different kinds of couples. Thus, from a pluralist perspective, such a policy
would hardly improve the spousal diversity available for those who are restricted
rule. Ten years later, neither their financial situations nor their lifestyles have changed. There is
no reason to impose the equal-division rule against their original agreement in such a case.
Furthermore, even in cases in which the ex post review leads the court to invalidate the original
agreement, the result should not be the automatic application of regular cohabitants'
commitments. For example, even if the court invalidates partners' agreements that deny any
partnership between them, the result should not be the automatic imposition of standard
cohabitation commitments (that is, equal division of property). Rather, another method for
compensating the domestic partner for her contributions should be applied.
288. See supra notes 85-86 and accompanying text (citing articles describing the
applicability of contract theory to same-sex partners and the prominent role of same-sex couples
in the movement to regularize nonmarital cohabitation).
289. See Lifshitz, supra note 100, at 376-78 (describing the function of cohabitation in
Israel as substitute to marriage).
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from marriage, while it would severely harm the existing social diversity for all
partners.
290
Unlike cohabitation, civil union is a formal institution that enables
cohabitants to signal their mutual commitments ex ante. Thus, imposing marriage
commitments on civil union partners enables the law to separate between those
who have not married because the law forbids it, and those who would not marry
even if they could. Yet as long as same-sex partners are excluded from marriage,
the pluralist's requirement for substantive freedom of choice between the various
spousal institutions is not fulfilled, and even a civil union is not a sufficient
solution for same-sex couples. Consequently, from a pluralist perspective,
liberals should continue the struggle for same-sex marriage and consider political
compromises291 that equate its legal regulation (albeit not the title of civil unions)
to that of marriage,29 2 while at the same time continuing to oppose the
establishment of cohabitation as a sole alternative to marriage.
In the interim, while legislators prevent both same-sex marriage and civil
unions, a liberal court should develop a unique cohabitants' regime for same-sex
couples. Unlike the standard cohabitation law regime that selectively applies
components of marriage law,293 the default rule of this regime should uniformly
impose all marriage law commitments on same-sex cohabitants. Yet, this unique
regime should include entry requirements to screen trial period cohabitants as
well as flexible contract-out options for those same-sex cohabitants who, like
different-sex couples, reject marriage commitments.
B. Religious Marriage
Historically, marriage and divorce law in the Western world have been
adjudicated in religious courts, in accordance with religious law.294 In several
290. Cf Garrison, supra note 15, at 872 ("Much as one may sympathize with same-sex
couples who want to make marital commitments, it makes no sense to sweep the overwhelming
majority of cohabitants who do not want to make such commitments into a conscriptive regime
in order to provide a third-rate solution for the few same-sex cohabitants who do.").
291. See Lifshitz, supra note 100, at 380-81 (discussing the concept of liberal
compromise).
292. According to the pluralist approach, in a perfect liberal world that permitted same-sex
marriages, the institution of civil union could serve as a middle ground between marriage and
cohabitation. However, in the present situation in which same-sex marriages are prohibited,
same-sex couples joined in a civil union should be granted the full rights and responsibilities of
married couples, according to the pluralist perspective.
293. See supra note 24 (explaining the "in-between approaches" of the pluralist model,
which selectively choose the proper components of marital law to apply to cohabitants).
294. See generally WrTTn, supra note 40 (describing the theological background of
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countries, the religious legal regulation of marriage and divorce law continues
to the present, alongside or instead of civil law.29 Although U.S. marriage and
divorce laws are secular-civil, 296 many citizens of the United States still marry
and divorce in religious ceremonies, and, in a deeper sense, perceive
297themselves as subject to communal and religious legal systems.
Consequently, courts often address the validity of private arrangements in
which the spouses have applied religious law or jurisdiction to their
298i 299relationships.  Furthermore, in the spirit of multicultural theories, some
propose turning religious marriage into an official marriage track offered by the
civil legal system.3°
The civil regulation of religious marriage is often analyzed from the
perspective of banning religious establishments 30' and in light of the rights of
Western marriage law).
295. See, e.g., Nichols, supra note 32, at 164-95 (describing legal systems that recognize
religious marriage partly or fully).
296. See Ann Laquer Estin, Embracing Tradition: Pluralism in American Family Law, 63
MD. L. REv. 540, 540 (2004) ("[W]e are used to understanding contemporary family law as
secular and universal."). But see NANCY F. COTT, PUBLIC Vows: A HISTORY OF MARRIAGE AND
ThE NATION 9-13 (2000) (describing the close identification between the civil concept of
marriage and the Christian religious tradition during the time the U.S. was founded).
297. See Estin, supra note 296, at 540 ("[M]illions of Americans identify themselves as
members of minority cultural and religious traditions, including Judaism, Islam, Buddhism,
Hinduism, and hundreds of others.").
298. See id. ("Courts deciding family law disputes regularly encounter unfamiliar ethnic,
religious, and legal traditions, including Islamic and Hindu wedding celebrations, Muslim and
Jewish premarital agreements, divorce arbitration in rabbinic tribunals, and foreign custody
orders entered by religious courts.").
299. See generally AYELET SHACHAR, MULTICULTURAL JURISDICTIONS 92-145 (2001)
(describing four models of multicultural joint governance and suggesting a new model); WILL
KYMLICKA, MULTICULTURAL CITIZENSHIP 193-95 (1995) (suggesting a liberal theory of minority
rights).
300. See Nichols, supra note 32, at 135-36 (suggesting that "the civil government should
consider ceding some of its jurisdictional authority over marriage and divorce law to religious
communities"). But cf Sebastian Pouter, The Claim to a Separate Islamic System of Personal
Law for British Muslims, in IsLAMIC FAMILY LAW 147-66 (Chibli Mallat & Jane Connors eds.,
1990) (discussing the attempts of the Union of Muslim Organisations of UK and Eire to secure a
separate Islamic system of personal law for British Muslims).
301. See, e.g., Estin,supra note 296, at 542 (acknowledging that enforcement of a marital
agreement in a religious context "verges dangerously on a religious establishment"); see also
Edward S. Nadel, New York's Get Laws: A Constitutional Analysis, 27 COLuM. J.L. & SOC.
PROBS. 55, 78-99 (1993) (addressing constitutional problems regarding regulation of Jewish
divorce settlements); Kent Greenawalt, Religious Law and Civil Law: Using Secular Law to
Assure Observance of Practices with Religious Significance, 71 S. CAL. L. REV. 781, 810-39
(1998) (same).
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minority communities to legal autonomy.0 2 Although these important
questions are beyond the scope of this article, in the following paragraphs, I
offer several insights from a pluralistic approach that may enrich the debate on
these topics.
Legal recognition of the religious marriage track as alongside the civil
marriage track is seemingly consistent with the pluralistic approach, which
seeks to enrich the existing menu with new spousal institutions. Yet, it is
unclear whether the substantive contents of significant parts of religious
marriage law could satisfy the pluralist theory's requirement of substantive
freedom of choice, prevention of exploitation, and right of exit. First, the
pluralistic approach demands substantive freedom of choice between the
various institutions. It requires that the religious marriage track be not selected
as the result of social and family pressures, which could potentially eliminate an
individual's ability to choose between the secular and religious tracks.
03
Second, religious family law systems are, in some cases, characterized by
unequal gender practices, such as the denial of women's rights to family
property, a double standard in sexual morality, 304 and even polygamy.305 These
characteristics do not conform to the pluralistic approach's commitment to
preventing exploitation and inferiority within the spousal institutions.30 6
Finally, the severe limitations on the dissolution of the marital relationship
302. Compare Kukathas, supra note 144, at 686, 687 (supporting communities' legal
autonomy limited by formal right of exit), with Susan Muller Okin, Feminism and
Multiculturalism: Some Tensions, 108 ETHics 661, 664 (1998) ("[T]here is considerable
likelihood of conflict between feminism and group rights for minority cultures.").
303. Cf SHACHAR, supra note 299, at 68-70 (criticizing Kukathas's multiculturalist
approach for failing to address the lack of substantive choice in the ostensibly consensual
decisionmaking of minority group members).
304. See, e.g., JAMAL J. NASIR, THE STATUS OF WOMEN UNDER ISLAMIC LAW AND UNDER
MODERN ISLAMIC LEGISLATION (1990) (describing female inferiority in Muslim marriage and
divorce law); Michael S. Berger & Deborah E. Lipstadt, Women in Judaism from the
Perspective of Human Rights, in HUMAN RIGHTS IN JUDAISM: CULTURAL, RELIGIOUS, AND
POLITICAL PERSPECTIVES 77, 89-111 (Michael J. Broyde & John Witte, Jr. eds., 1998)
(describing women's inferiority in various fields of Jewish marriage and divorce law); RACHEL
BtALE, WOMEN AND JEWISH LAW: THE ESSENTIAL TEXTS, THEIR HISTORY, AND THEIR RELEVANCE
FOR TODAY 70-101 (1984) (same). But see Martha C. Nussbaum, International Human Rights
Law in Practice: India: Implementing Sex Equality Through Law, 2 Cm. J. INT'L L. 35,43-47
(2001) (discussing the position of women in India under Islamic law).
305. See Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 145 (1878) (validating the constitutional
ban on polygamy); see also Estin, supra note 296, at 566 (describing the tension between
American family law values and the practice of polygamy in Islamic marriage); Nussbaum,
supra note 304, at 44 (stating that, in India, polygamy is a legal option for Muslim men, but is
exercised in only about 5% of marriages).
306. See supra Part III.B.2 (discussing the pluralist theory's emphasis on legal institutions
which prevent exploitation and subordination among married or cohabiting partners).
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characteristic of certain religions3°7 are inconsistent with the pluralistic
approach's commitment to the right of exit.
It should be clarified, though, that the theory's stance toward religious
regulation of spousal relationships is contingent upon the existing cultural
background and the specific content of the religious laws. Should a religious
community and law satisfy the demands of free entry, establish equality within
the relationship, and have reasonable exit options, then the law should validate
private agreements to apply religious marriage law, and the pluralist theory
might even support the state's offering these religious tracks as options.
Moreover, an exclusive focus on the secular-civil aspects, which
disregards the religious aspect of marriage and the religious arrangement
between the parties, might harm the values of individual autonomy and equality
that the pluralistic approach seeks to preserve. Take, for example, the case of
an Orthodox Jewish divorce. According to Jewish law, spouses who were
married in a religious ceremony are deemed married as long as they do not
religiously divorce.3°8 The religious divorce ceremony requires the voluntary
granting of a divorce bill (get) by the husband to the wife.30 9 In the event of a
civil divorce, religious law considers the spouses to be married as long as a get
has not been given. 3 This leads to an unacceptable situation, in which some
Jewish men who were married in a religious ceremony and obtain a divorce in
the civil courts exploit their wives' need for a religious get.311 The husbands
307. See W=ITE, supra note 40, at 36, 38, 40 (discussing the absence of an absolute divorce
option under Catholic law); Irving Breitowitz, The Plight of the Agunah: A Study in Halacha,
Contract, and the First Amendment, 51 MD. L. REv. 312, 319-21 (1992) (describing barriers to
divorce within Jewish law); JAMAL J. NASIR, THE IsLAMIc LAW OF PERSONAL STATUS 112-45
(1990) (describing the differences between Muslim males' right to divorce and the limitation on
Muslim women who want to get unilateral divorce).
308. See Breitowitz, supra note 307, at 319 ("A civil divorce has no effect.., and any
subsequent cohabitation or remarriage in the absence of a get is regarded as adulterous.").
309. See id. at 319-21 (describing the procedure by which a husband grants a get).
310. See id. at 321 ("[The get is totally unrelated to either the granting or withholding of
civil dissolution [of the marriage].").
311. According to Jewish religious law, the status of a Jewish woman whose husband
refuses to give her a get is much worse than the parallel situation of a man whose wife refuses to
be divorced. Id. at 313. A woman in this condition (in halakhic (Jewish law) terminology, an
agunah) cannot remarry. Id. If she has children from someone other than her husband, the
offspring are mamzerim (individuals seriously restricted in their own ability to marry). Id. at
324 n.48. A man refused divorce, in contrast, can, in certain instances, receive rabbinical
permission to take an additional wife. Id. at 325. Moreover, the children born out of wedlock
to a married man are not mamzerim. Id. at 324 n.48. Husbands, thus, are in better positions to
not cooperate in a religious divorce.
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make their cooperation in granting the get conditional upon a payment
(purchasing a get settlement).311
Secular civil disregard for the religious dimension of marriage that enables
this coercion is opposed to the values of autonomy and equality. In contrast,
civil recognition of the validity of religious arrangements that obligate the
husband to cooperate in the religious procedure will likely reduce this
313coercion. Hence, the pluralistic approach supports the imposition of a
religious obligation to cooperate with the religious divorce ceremony in these
cases. For example, the pluralistic approach's commitment to the value of
autonomy and the prevention of exploitation led it to support the Get Law,314
New York legislation that imposes civil sanctions on spouses wed in a Jewish
ceremony who refuse to cooperate with the religious dissolution of their
315marriage.
In summation, the pluralistic approach would be suspicious of turning
religious marriage into an official marriage track recognized by the state; in
certain instances, it would recognize private arrangements that contain religious
elements, but would make them subject to judicial review, and it would support
civil actions meant to prevent exploitation and harm to autonomy, even when
these actions cooperate with religious arrangements and practice.
312. See id. at 318 ("[In recent years we have seen the emergence of a different sort of
agunah case: one in which the husband is very much alive and present but uses his power to
grant or withhold a get as a stranglehold to wring out favorable concessions from his spouse.").
313. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Goldman, 554 N.E.2d 1016, 1022 (Ill. App. Ct. 1990)
(validating a Jewish pre-marital contract and allowing couples to be governed by Jewish law,
resulting in a civil court compelling the husband to issue get, as required by Beth Din (Jewish
religious court)). But see Victor v. Victor, 866 P.2d 899, 902 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1993) (refusing to
give civil validity to a similar clause).
314. There are actually two get laws. For the 1983 Get Law (as amended substantially in
1984), see N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 253 (McKinney 1999 & Supp. 2009). For the 1992 Get Act,
see N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 236B(5)(h), (6)(d) (McKinney 1999 & Supp. 2009). For analysis of
these laws, see Marvin E. Jacob, The Agunah Problem and the So-Called New York State Get
Law: A Legal and Halachic Analysis, in WOMEN IN CHAINs: A SOURCEBOOK ON THE AGuNAH
159, 161-64 (Jack Nusan Porter ed., 1995).
315. Cf Nichols, supra note 32, at 163-64 (describing get law as an expression of legal
pluralism within marriage law). Unlike Nichols, who supports both get law and the recognition
of religious marriage as a semi-autonomous marriage track, this Article's commitment to the
liberal values of individual autonomy and equality leads it to distinguish between the two. It
opposes the recognition of a religious marriage track on the grounds that this might harm
individual autonomy and gender equality. At the same time, and in the name of those two
values, it supports the get law as a means of saving exploited women.
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C. Covenant Marriage
The liberal transformation316 that divorce law underwent in the last decades of
the twentieth century from fault divorce to no-fault unilateral divorce has drawn harsh
criticism. Critics of the liberal transformation blamed modem divorce law for the rise
in the divorce rate, harm to women and children, and the general harm to the
institution of maniage.3 17 Against this background, they called for a counter-
revolution. 31 Although the demand to limit grounds for divorce was not completely
victorious in any American state, the critics of the modem divorce law model
nevertheless won a certain victory when the state of Louisiana,319 along with other
states,320 added a new marriage track called "covenant marriage." In covenant
marriage states, spouses may choose either a regular marriage that is subject to regular
marriage law or a covenantal marriage.321 "Covenant marriage laws have three key
features: (1) mandatory premarital counseling that stresses the seriousness of
marriage... ; (2) the premarital signing of a... Declaration of Intent... requiring
couples to make 'all reasonable efforts to preserve the marriage, including marriage
counseling' in the event of difficulties; and (3) the provision of limited grounds for
divorce."3 22 In the conventional political discourse, the special track is perceived as a
victory of the conservative approaches,
323 and is accordingly criticized by liberals.
324
316. See supra note 40 and accompanying text (discussing the liberalization of divorce
law).
317. See Nichols, supra note 32, at 139 (describing the counter-revolution including
covenant-marriage proposals that resulted from the serious crisis of marriage in civil society,
with effects on children and adults).
318. See Laura Bradford, Note, The Counterrevolution: A Critique ofRecent Proposals to
Reform No-Fault Divorce Laws, 49 STAN. L. REV. 607, 622-26 (1997) (describing and
critiquing proposals to reform no-fault divorce).
319. See generally LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:272 (2008).
320. See generally ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 25-901 to -906 (2007); ARK. CODE ANN.
§§ 9-11-801 to -811 (2008).
321. See generally LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:272 (2006); ARiz. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 25-901
to -906 (2006); ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 9-11-801 to -811 (2006).
322. See Nichols, supra note 32, at 148-53 (describing the principles of the covenant
marriage).
323. See Melissa S. LaBauve, Comment, Covenant Marriages: A Guise for Lasting
Commitment?, 43 LOY. L. REV. 421 (1997) (describing covenant marriage as a conservative
effort to make divorce harder); Katherine S. Spaht, Louisiana's Covenant Marriage: Social
Analysis and Legal Implications, 59 LA. L. REV. 63, 72-74 (1998) (discussing and defending
the origins and provisions of Louisiana's covenant marriage law); see also Nichols, supra note
32, at 154 ("[I]n Louisiana, [the lawmakers] introduce[d] a covenant marriage law to
'strengthen the family' by turning a 'culture of divorce' into a 'culture of marriage.'").
324. See Jeanne Louise Carriere, "It's Dej Vu All Over Again": The Covenant Marriage
Act in Popular Cultural Perception and Legal Reality, 72 TUL. L. REV. 1701, 1714-18, 1741-
42 (1998) (contending that Louisiana's covenant marriage law will likely increase litigation and
1632
MARRIED AGAINST THEIR WILL?
The pluralist approach, however, sheds a completely different light on covenant
marriage.
First, covenantal marriage was not accepted in any state as the sole marriage
track, but rather as an additional option alongside the regular marriage track 1
25
Consequently, such marriages can be viewed as a pluralistic method of enriching the
range of social institutions in society, and not as a conservative effort
326
Second, unlike traditional family law and certain religious law, covenantal
marriage does not adopt double standards for men and women, and does not include
exploitative components.
327
Third, even though covenant marriage extends the waiting period before divorce
beyond what is common in the conventional tracks, it enables a determined party to
demand and obtain a divorce in a period of not more than two years. The legal
literature contains trenchant debates as to whether extending the waiting period from
the request for divorce to its attainment is worthwhile.328 The conventional legal
approaches maintain that the state must clearly decide in favor of one of these
positions.129 The Pluralistic approach, in contrast; enables the spouses to decide
between the available options. Just as the pluralistic approach refuses to choose forthe
parties between the package deal of marriage and the package deal ofcohabitation, and
increase the likelihood of spousal abuse); Robert M. Gordon, The Limits ofLimits on Divorce,
107 YALE L.J. 1435, 1446-61 (1998) (criticizing the counter-revolution from realistic and
liberal perspectives); LaBauve, supra note 323, at 438-39 (criticizing efforts to make divorce
harder); Daniel W. Olivas, Comment, Tennessee Considers Adopting the Louisiana Covenant
Marriage Act: A Law Waiting to Be Ignored, 71 TENN. L. REv. 769, 795 (2004) (contending
that covenant marriage law is both ineffective and inefficient).
325. See Nichols, supra note 32, at 148 (stating that Arizona, Arkansas, and Louisiana
covenant marriage laws "provide state-sanctioned, alternate, voluntary forms of marriage"
alongside traditional marriage options).
326. For a unique view in this light, see Joel A. Nichols, Louisiana's Covenant Marriage
Statute: A First Step Toward a More Robust Pluralism in Marriage and Divorce Law?, 47
EMORY L.J. 929, 932 (1998). Nichols justifies Louisiana's covenant marriage laws on the basis
of pluralism. Id. But cf Chauncey E. Brummer, The Shackles of Covenant Marriage: Who
Holds the Keys to Wedlock?, 25 U. ARK. LrrrLE ROCK L. REv. 261,293 (2003) ("[S]anctioning
covenant marriage... may lead to the false impression that couples who enter one.., are
somehow 'more married' and thus entitled to greater protection than those who enter into
traditional marriage."). This view, however, overlooks the equal respect principle of the
pluralist approach.
327. See, e.g., Nichols, supra note 32, at 151 (listing grounds for divorce under Louisiana
covenant marriage law, which apply equally for husband or wife).
328. See supra notes 317-24 (presenting arguments for and against covenant marriage
laws).
329. See, e.g., LaBauve, supra note 323, at 441 ("[C]ouples who wish to marry in
Louisiana would probably be better served with just one set of laws to regulate their marriage.").
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therefore offers both possibilities to the spouses, this approach offers them two
marriage tracks.
33°
VI. Conclusion and Further Challenges
There exists a dichotomy within the philosophical scholarship between liberal-
neutral approaches that equate the regulation of different spousal institutions and
perfectionist approaches like the traditional status model that prefer one institution-
marriage-over others. This Article breaks this dichotomy by designing marriage and
cohabitation as two equally respectable options and yet distinguishing their regulation.
En route to this conclusion, this Article develops a pluralist theory that emphasizes the
responsibility of the liberal state to create a range of spousal institutions, thereby
providing meaningful choices to individuals. The theory offers three rationales for
distinguishing marriage and cohabitation: screening mechanisms, autonomy, and
efficiency analysis that focus on the signaling effect of marriage. Those rationales
prescribe three cornerstones for the design of cohabitation as social institution:
(1) substantive freedom of choice at entry, (2) tolerance for couples' lifestyles, limited
by state responsibility for preventing exploitation; and (3) restricted individualism,
emphasizing the right of exit, yet respectful of relational commitments. Driven by
those cornerstones, this Article offers an innovative and comprehensive legal model
that, unlike existing all-or-nothing approaches, applies marriage law to cohabitation
selectively and distinguishes between different kinds of cohabitants. The Article
further elaborates its pluralist approach to the broader issue of spousal regulation
including same-sex marriage and civil union, covenant marriage and secular regulation
of religious marriage.
Yet, this Article is limited to the internal relationship between couples and does
not address the external dimension--namely the relationship between the spouses and
external parties, and especially benefits that are given by the state on the basis of
marriage. It will be a stimulating challenge to suggest a pluralist regulation of the
external dimension and to differentiate it from both the neutral and the perfectionist
approaches. This challenge, however, is beyond the scope of the present article.
331
330. Additionally, the pluralist approach allows freedom of contract that enables spouses to
adapt the general spousal institutions to their own needs. Yet, this freedom of contract is
limited by the theory's requirements of substantive free entry, prevention of exploitation, and
right of exit.
331. See generally Shahar Lifshitz, The External Rights of Cohabiting Couples in Israel,
37 ISR. L. REv. 346 (2003-2004) (offering such a theory in the context of Israeli law); Shahar
Lifshitz, Spousal Rights and Spousal Duties, in THE JURISPRUDENCE OF MARRIAGE AND OTHER
INTIMATE RELATIONSHIPS (Scott Fitzgibbon ed., forthcoming 2010) ("[I]t is appropriate to
promote legal marriage, and thus a distinction ought to be made between the scope of rights
granted to cohabitants and those granted to married couples.").
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